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The topic of this Masters mini-dissertation is amnesty and the principle of individual 
accountability for gross human rights violations. The field in which this topic is located is that 
of transitional justice. The issue with which this mini-dissertation is concerned is the practical, 
political and moral problems which states in transition from authoritarian regimes to newly 
established democratic government based on human rights have experienced in the last three 
decades when seeking accountability for the past atrocities. These state transitions have 
significantly employed amnesty as a means to address the need for peace and stability at the 
end of conflict, but this has tended to foreclose the possibility of holding the previous regime 
accountable for its legacy of human rights abuse. The historical context of this enquiry is the 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT) in Germany 1945 1946, which 
established a precedent for individual criminal accountability for crimes against humanity. 
The Nuremberg precedent fundamentally assumed that individuals at every level of the 
authorisation of crime are accountable for their own actions. Since the Milgram experiment 
on obedience to orders in the 1960s, social science experiments have shown, however, that 
individuals acting under orders do not perceive of their moral autonomy as clearly as 
previously assumed. In the light of the historical transitions since Nuremberg, the recent 
innovation in the South African Constitution in 1995, which introduces the notion of 
conditional amnesty, represents a novel attempt to hold individuals accountable. It required 
individual acknowledgement and full disclosure in public ofthe responsibility for heinous 
deeds. This framework also grants amnesty for gross human rights violations committed in 
the execution of an order of, on behalf of or with the approval of a political organisation. Few 
commentators have addressed the question of whether such conditional amnesty may be 
compatible with the Nuremberg model of accountability. The specific task which this mini-
dissertation sets out is, therefore, to 1) clarify the concept of accountability, 2) determine in 
which senses one may hold individuals accountable for their actions, and 3) assess whether, to 
what extent and how the South African amnesty may achieve the accountability required by a 
liberal-democratic framework which upholds the moral principle that individuals are 
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This mini-dissertation poses the question of how, and to what extent, the recent South African 
conditional amnesty makes possible the accountability for gross human rights violations 
required by transitional justice. Such accountability has traditionally been sought, following 
the precedent set by the Nuremberg model, through prosecution and punishment, which 
precludes any notion of amnesty. 
The context of this study is that of post-conflict societies that are in transition from 
authoritarian or totalitarian regimes to the establishment of a new moral social order based on 
human rights and the rule of law. To the extent that their needs are associated with transitional 
justice, three distinct but related areas will be clarified: the moral, legal and political. These 
respecti vely concern three core aspects of accountability: 1) the establishment of a human 
rights culture, 2) the establishment of rule oflaw and 3) the consolidation of a peaceful 
transition to a new (democratic) regime and social order. 
These three aspects of accountability need to be seen in the context of a further consideration: 
accountability needs to be both retributive and preventative, to reconerle "the backward-
looking need" of holding perpetrators accountable for past atrocities with "the forward-
looking need" for a peaceful transition to a new regime and the establishment of the rule of 
law. 
The establishment of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg in 1945 for 
prosecuting the major German war criminals after World War Two created a watershed in 
international law in so far as it established the precedent that individuals are criminally 
accountable for "crimes against humanity." This significantly ruled out the previously 
sovereign immunity enjoyed by state agents for human rights crimes committed under the 
state (Teitel, 1999:48; Ratner and Abrams, 2001:6 - 7). 
Nevertheless, in the context of this historical framework, the last three decades have 
witnessed a series of transitions from repressive regimes to democracy in which states have 
experienced !,Tfave practical and political obstacles to the prosecution and punishment of state 










the principles established at Nuremberg. Due to the balance of power and/or the necessity of a 
political compromise, state agents connected with the prior regime have to a large extent 
retained political and/or military power, making it difficult for the new civilian governments 
to deal with the legacy of human rights violations. The general practice of the new regimes 
has been to respond to the past violations by passing general amnesty laws to the previous 
government agents. This violated the precedent that individuals responsible for gross human 
rights violations should be held criminally accountable. 
However, it is not clear whether prosecution and punishment is the only means of achieving 
the accountability (or justice) required in transitional states. In this regard, the South African 
amnesty process presents a significant innovation. It has introduced conditional amnesty, 
which is limited in scope and requires a public process in which individual perpetrators of 
politically motivated crimes stand to account by being required to fully disclose the nature of 
the gross human rights violations they were party to. This individualised public amnesty 
process challenges the notion that prosecution and punishment is the only way of achieving 
individual accountability for gross human rights violations. 
This mini-dissertation thus looks at the possibility of conditional amnesty as another, non-
punitive means of accountability. The question posed here is, therefore, whether, and to what 
extent, the accountability for gross human rights violations achieved by such conditional 
amnesty serves the purpose of the accountability traditionally sought, since Nuremberg, 
through prosecution and punishment. 
In order to set the framework for answering this question, the dissertation will provide a 
conceptual analysis of what is actually meant by accountability. This will enable one to 
distinguish 1) between levels and degrees by which individuals may be held responsible for 
the commissioning of human rights crimes and 2) how to separate who and in which relevant 
senses those responsible are accountable. 
A fundamental implication of the Nuremberg's precedent of holding individuals accountable 
for gross human rights violations is the assumption that individuals under authority structures 












Social science investigations into obedience to authority since the 1960s have conducted 
experiments that contradict this assumption. In one of the famous cases, Professor Stanley 
Milgram of Yale University published a series of experiments on obedience in 1965 that 
found that, when instructed to act under a presumed legitimate authority, the average person 
will obey orders that contradict his/her own moral choice (Miller, 1986:9). Evidence such as 
this has led the social sciences to question whether individuals under authority structures 
actually perceive themselves as having a moral choice when prompted to act on command. 
The findings of relevant social science research into crimes of obedience require a 
reconsideration of the Nuremberg principles as model for transitional justice. Against this 
background, when the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was 
mandated to grant amnesty to perpetrators responsible for politically motivated gross human 
rights violations, it accepted as one of its central requirements for amnesty that it was only 
granted to people who acted under authority structures. It therefore applied only to 
perpetrators who had acted on behalf of, with the support of, or on the order of a political 
organisation (Republic of South Africa Act No. 34,20 (2) (3) (e)). This requirement 
contradicts the Nuremberg precedent that superior orders should be no exception to the rule of 
holding individuals criminally accountable for gross human rights violations. The South 
African TRC has nevertheless been acclaimed as a model of amnesty that results in some kind 
of accountability that responds to the core notions of transitional justice. 
In explaining the problem of amnesty and accountability, this dissertation will evaluate a 
growing scholarly debate in the field of international law and transitional justice which 
addresses the political and practical obstacles posed by the need to accommodate peace and 
stability to the international obligation to hold perpetrators accountable for gross human rights 
violations. These studies take into account the special needs of social stability and 
reconciliation in post-conflict societies where a victim group or population had been 
systematically deprived of fundamental human rights, and/or where a violent conflict had 
resulted in large-scale violations of human rights and social instability. Importantly, they do 
not consider prosecution and punishment to be the only necessary means to accountability for 
mass gross human rights violations (Van Zyl, 2000:43; Zalaquett, 1995:6; Slye, 2002:245 











Finally, this dissertation will analyse and investigate the aims and objectives of the TRC 
according to the 6-volume TRC report published in 1998 and 2003. It will also consider the 
actual amnesty criteria stipulated by the TRC Act passed by the South African Parliament in 
1995. 
The chapter structure will be as follows: 
• Chapter One: A conceptual analysis of accountability and the basic criteria for 
holding individuals accountable. 
• Chapter Two: A historical investigation of the Nuremberg precedent and the post-
Nuremberg political context. 
• Chapter Three: The implications of socio-psychological research into crimes of 
obedience for holding accountable individuals who act under authority structures. 
• Chapter Four: A discussion and analysis of the main positions adopted in the 
transitional justice literature regarding accountability objectives for transitional states. 
• Chapter Five: An investigation and analysis of the aims and objectives of the South 













The Concept of Individual Accountabilitv 
1.1 The Quest for Accountability after Gross Human Rights Violations 
Responsibility and accountability are key aspects of moral and political life and ofthe legal 
order. With respect to morality, the fundamental axiom holds that moral agents are 
responsible for their own actions. With regard to politics, the appropriate structures of 
accountability are crucial to holding representatives and agents of government liable for their 
duties and responsibilities in democratic governments, modem organisations, and 
bureaucracies. Legally, the procedures for determining and adjudicating criminal 
responsibility and accountability for crimes or violations of rights are central to the criminal 
justice system. 
Transitional justice extends these three concerns to the context of transitions from 
authoritarian regimes to democratic government. This involves both crimes under a prior 
regIme and the founding of a new liberal and democratic rights culture. It also involves both 
the perpetrators and victims of human rights atrocities. Political atrocities and grave violations 
of human rights typically occur during civil wars or under authoritarian rule. 
Societies that manage to bring such violent conflicts to an end, or that achieve transitions 
from authoritarian rule to some form of democracy, do not thereby simply escape the legacies 
of such past atrocities and human rights violations. The classic way in which a society may 
commit itself to the creation of a moral, legal and political environment where violations of 
human rights are no longer accepted is through the introduction of a Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. Some, e.g. the liberal philosopher Bruce Ackernlan in The Future of the Liberal 
Revolution (1992:46), argue that such forward-looking measures are more important than any 
backward-looking measures that seek to deal with the past. This thesis will argue, however, 
that for societies emerging from a legacy of large-scale, heinous human rights violations, 
forward-looking measures are insufficient. They do not deal with the need to not only hold the 
responsible perpetrators accountable but to also restore moral dignity to victims. The needs of 
post-conflict societies in transformation are, furthernlore, intrinsically connected with both 










forward-looking measures that address the need for future deterrence (Zalaquett, 1995:5; 
Zalaquett quoted in interview by Roht-Arriaza, 1999: 197; Nino, 1996: 142; Orentlicher, 
1995:408). 
Holding individuals accountable, both for their own actions and also for what others have 
done under their authority, is fundamentally associated with the notion of moral agency. 
According to this, each individual would be accountable to the community in which he or she 
resides. By adopting this notion of moral agency, a community would be taking seriously the 
idea that individuals are independent, conscious beings capable of judging their own 
behaviour and therefore responsible for it. Accountability is a way in which a moral 
community regulates human conduct and asserts its norms on its members (Nino, 1996: 143 -
144). 
The question this dissertation asks is whether prosecution and punishment is the only 
meaningful way in which perpetrators of past gross human rights violations may be held 
accountable. To answer to this question it is necessary to have a basic understanding of what 
it means to be accountable and what is involved in holding individuals accountable. That will 
be the specific topic of this chapter. 
Following the calamity of gross human rights violations, uncovering those responsible and 
guilty is a murky business. It involves distinguishing the moral, political and legal issues and 
eventually deciding who are to be held to account, to whom and for what. Political atrocities 
involve not only the primary perpetrators and political decision-makers but also a range of 
political and non-political actors who are in varying degrees involved in the commission of 
human rights violations. Apart from the direct perpetrators there are also the instigators, 
bystanders, collaborators, beneficiaries, subordinates etc. Bureaucratic atrocities such as the 
Holocaust are impossible without the silent consent of bystanders and the indirect assistance 
of civil servants in such mundane tasks as the performance of bureaucratic routines, transport 
and filing of documents. These tasks serve an indispensable function in the day-by-day 
running of any large-scale organisation (Thompson, 1987:44; Fletcher and Weinstein, 
2002:605). 
This scenario works differently in different types of regime. According to Tina Rosenberg 











regimes." She also distinguishes "ethnic conflict" as a third regime type. In "regimes of 
criminals," a small powerful elite is responsible for the repression of the population. Typically 
they would rely on the ignorance and absence of participation in politics of the general 
population (Rosenberg, 1999:336). In such regimes the atrocities would be illegal and often 
concentrated as intense repression on a particular group of the population, as in the Latin 
American military dictatorships' "disappearances" of political dissidents in the early 1980s 
(Rosenberg, 1999:332). 
It is, therefore, in principle if not necessarily in practice, easier to identify the perpetrators in 
the aftermath of these regimes than in the case of "criminal regimes" where the regime itself 
is structurally and ideologically embedded and the leadership relies on indoctrination inherent 
in nearly all aspects oflife. The commission of human rights violations in criminal regimes is 
therefore widespread, legal (at the time of commission) and relies on the tolerance and 
acceptance of most of the population (Rosenberg, 1999:336). In the communist dictatorships 
of Eastern Europe (the most common example of criminal regimes) the state relied on control 
through rewarding collaboration of citizens with state benefits (Rosenberg, 1999:337). In such 
cases the distinctions between victims and perpetrators of human rights violations are much 
more unclear and it is difficult to determine who, if anyone, should or could be held 
accoui1table. 
Much the same applies to ethnic war as a third type of repressive regime where religion, race, 
or tribal or ethnic identity causes divisions and violent hostility between groups of people 
(Rosenberg, 1999:251). A society immersed in conflict based on identity makes everyone see 
him/herself as a victim and no one sees him/herself as a perpetrator, since all members of the 
society get (willingly or unwillingly) immersed into the conflict and forced to fight for their 
physical and/or cultural survival (Rosenberg, 1999:249). The most recent and prominent 
examples of such conflict are the Rwandan and Bosnian ci viI wars. In these cases, too, the 
quest for accountability is immensely complicated. 
The situation in apartheid South Africa, which is the case study for this mini-dissertation, 
represents features of all three regime types. As in the case of "regimes of criminals," illegal 
acts of repression were committed. Like communism and other "criminal regimes," the 
bureaucratic system of apartheid depended on widespread societal complicity (Rosenberg, 











along several "racial divisions," between whites and blacks on one level and between 
different ethnic groups of blacks on another. Race was politicised by the white apartheid 
government and some of the liberation movements; ethnicity was politicised by the conf1ict 
between movements such as the African National Congress and the Zulu Inkatha Freedom 
Party. 
The nexus of accountability and responsibility poses two important problems when it comes 
to holding perpetrators of gross human rights violations accountable. An agent in a position of 
higher authority may be involved, especially in complex bureaucratic or political contexts, in 
initiating a project or setting a policy objective but not necessarily in its actual 
implementation or execution. In such a case, the problem is to what extent should the superior 
be held accountable in terms of command/political responsibility if this results in gross human 
rights violations. The same problem arises when a subordinate who executes the project or 
policy in practice may not actually be responsible for having made the decision to initiate this 
course of action or for setting its policy objectives but is only acting as a functionary or 
following instructions. As a moral agent he or she would still be responsible for his or her 
own acts, including any political atrocities and not merely be accountable to the superior 
under whose auspices these were undertaken. 
This scenario poses the need to understand accountability and its relation to responsibility in 
social structures. The subsequent introductory analysis will therefore focus on the following 
central issue: 
What is the relationship between accountability and responsibility, and under 
what circumstances will holding someone accountable be compatible with holding 
him or her responsible? 
First, a brief look at the origin of the concept of individual accountability will give the 












1.2 The Religious and Philosophical Origins of the Notion of Accountability 
The modern concept of accountability has religious and philosophical roots in the ancient 
Judaic and Greek traditions. According to the Judaic biblical tradition a group of tribes, later 
known as the Israelites, escaped from bondage in Egypt and made their way into Canaan 
around 1200 B.c. Along the way, they made a pledge to their special God through the 
prophet Moses. This founding covenant binding Israel as a people made them accountable to 
God in return for God's protection (The Ho~y Scriptures, Genesis 31.43 and Exodus 20.2 - 7). 
The Old Testament idea that the Chosen People was subject to divine judgement was later 
popularised through the more inclusive Christian notion of the Last Judgement and extended 
to the whole of humanity (Clarke, 1996:309). This notion of some basic moral and religious 
accountability to God prevailed for many centuries and profoundly informed subsequent 
secular conceptions of individual accountability under the rule of law. The rise of absolutist 
monarchy and of the modern sovereign state positioned "the earthly ruler," who was 
responsible for "natural law," closer to God and above the common people. This in turn gave 
way to legal positivism and the sovereign state as the sole source of legitimate law (Douzinas, 
2000:63). The secular notion of accountability thereby developed into a series of functional 
requirements for rulers in asserting authority, such as delegating tasks with defined mandates 
and policy objectives, verifying the performance of those tasks, maintaining the 
responsiveness of accountable agents, assessing blame for accountable actions and sorting out 
responsibility among many agents (Romzek and Dubnick, 1998:6). 
The second main source of modem notions of accountability can be found in classical Greece. 
In a general sense, the Greek notion of accountability is concerned with questions of order or 
rules (law), of morals (ethics), and of social order (politics) (Clarke, 1996:309). Systematic 
and self-reflective thinking as a form of reason in the Western tradition can be traced back to 
Greek philosophy of around 450 B.c.', which was concerned with questions ofthe scope and 
justification of "right action" and the nature of justice (Clarke, 1996:307). This reflective 
spirit in ethical philosophy marked a break with uncritical adherence to tradition and custom 
and proposed a search for the best way to conduct one's life based on "virtue" (excellence) 
and "right action,,2 (Clarke, 1996:308). However, ancient Greek philosophy did not yet have 
I Socrates (469 399 S.C) is regarded as the first philosopher in ethics (Clarke, 1996:3(8). 
:; Plato (429 347 B.C) was the first thinker to criticise blind and uncritical acceptance of the authority of the 











a developed sense of the "individual" or "the self' as a "responsible being.,,3 This notion 
came about with Christianity's shift from an "outward compliance" with God's rule to an 
"inward compliance" through reason and consciousness (Clarke, 1996:310). 
Both the philosophical and religious origin of the notion of accountability assume a certain 
level of human capacity for individual self-reflection as a basis upon which individuals are 
expected to be responsible for their actions and capable of distinguishing ethically "right" 
from "wrong" actions. The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 - 1804) furthered the 
idea of a God-given natural law by arguing that the individual capacity for rational thinking 
enabled individuals to autonomously, without the help of societal rules or laws, distinguish an 
ethically right act from an ethically wrong act. According to Kant any moral act could be 
distinguished according to rational criteria (Kant, 1956:21). 
Whereas Kant's ethical approach to the individual is more that of seemg him or her as an 
autonomous agent than as a product of society, modem ethical philosophy recognises the 
social community as a moral entity in its own right. This means that it plays a role in the way 
the individual makes moral judgements since it is capable of shaping perceptions of the self 
and others (Clarke, 1996:311). Thus, individuals are assumed to be acting not only with free 
will but also with moral responsibility within the established norms of mo!'al communities. 
These social structures influence how and when individuals are held to answer for their 
actions to other people. 
This brings us back to the question raised above about the relationship between accountability 
and responsibility. When looking at this relationship, one needs to bear in mind both the role 
of moral responsibility in terms of the codes of the community and the individual's free will 
as a moral agent in Kant's sense. When, for instance, individuals commit gross atrocities in 
authoritarian contexts that elicit or condone such actions, transitional justice needs to not only 
address moral responsibility but also to assert individual accountability for the consequences. 
departure from ancient Greek thinking by conceiving ethical retlection as a practical shaping of one's character 
and one's intellect in conventional societies, as opposed to the ideal forms in Plato's Republic. This linked 
questions of ethics with questions of practical reasoning (Clarke, 1996:309). 
, The individual mmd or soul was referred to by different terms. Phrenes was used to refer to the mind outside of 
the individual and Pneuma in relation to the world spirit. None of these terms invoked individual responsibility 











However, unravelling the spectrum of human action, it becomes evident that the notions of 
responsibility and accountability, which are interlinked but distinct, should not be confused 
when attempting to hold individuals accountable for their actions. Thus, we need to establish 
what is involved in holding individuals responsible for their actions and how and in which 
senses this notion is similar to but distinct from the notion of holding individuals to 
accountable. 
1.3 Accountability in relation to Responsibility 
In the light of the above, the following observations can be made about the modem concept of 
accountability. First, it is a relational concept. Accountability implies or requires 1) a relation 
between an agent and an authority to whom the agent is accountable for his or her 
performance of a task or the disposal of some delegated authority and/or 2) a relation between 
an agent and some legal order to which the agent is bound subject to sanctions for 
transgressions. E.g. a lecturer is accountable to the school board who sets out the curriculum 
and also has to act in accordance with the rules of the school where he is teaching. Hence, 
accountability implies a duty or an obligation on the part of an agent who is answerable either 
I) in the context of a delegation of authority or 2) in the context of law. So, following from 
the previous example the lecturer would be answerable to the school board for teaching 
according to the rules of the school. 
Accountability presupposes individual moral agency. Holding individuals accountable 
assumes that they are capable of self-refleetive reasoning and have control over their own 
desires, intentions, actions and behaviour. E.g. an adult as opposed to a toddler is regarded as 
an individual with fully developed mental and physical abilities who is in control of his or her 
own actions. It is important to distinguish here between the notion of accountability and the 
related notion of responsibility: although accountability presupposes individual responsibility, 
individual responsibility does not necessarily imply individual accountability. For instance, 
hiring a moving company to transport one's personal items presupposes that, when something 
is broken, the moving company or person who caused it will be accountable. This does not 
mean that an employer who was responsible for breaking a lamp while moving it is held 
accountable. The company as a whole (which the employer is acting for) is held accountable. 











employer. Similarly it is possible that those who have to be held accountable may not 
necessarily be those directly responsible. In the previous example it is the moving company or 
their insurance company who stand in a contractual and thus accountable relationship to the 
owner ofthe broken lamp although neither the owners of the company or the insurance 
company "personally" broke the lamp. This raises the need to distinguish "responsible 
agency" from that of "holding an agent responsible." These issues will be dealt with in what 
follows from which separate and important criteria for holding individuals accountable will be 
analysed further in Chapter Four. 
1.3.1 Responsible Agency and Holding an Agent Responsible 
The notion of "responsibility" has a wide application. Generally speaking, responsibility is 
used in two distinct, but connected, senses: "X is responsible (for something)" and "X is held 
responsible by someone (for something)". "Being a responsible agent" refers to the ability of 
acting deliberately and with intention to achieve the desired outcome of one's actions 
though not all outcomes are intended (Mulgan, 1993 :535). A responsible individual is a 
person or agent who is assumed to be in charge or in control of his or her own actions and 
therefore able to freely choose how to conduct him or herself (Oshana, 2001: 13280 - 13281). 
For instance, a responsible individual is a person who is free to choose his or her own course 
of action as opposed to an individual who is being forced or for whom decisions are being 
made by others. Responsibility is also used to describe the act of "holding someone 
responsible." Whereas all individuals with sound mental faculties (excluding children under a 
legal age, mentally disabled or individuals declared insane etc.) are regarded as capable agents 
and therefore ipso facto responsible for their actions, holding a person liable to answer for 
certain actions implies more than this: it suggests that that person is not only responsible for 
his or her own actions but also answerable for them to some authority and so subject to 
possible sanction. In relation to the previous example of the lecturer, we may regard him as 
responsible to the school board for teaching the curriculum to his students, and in so far as he 
fulfils his job satisfactorily or not according to the school board's rules, he may be tired or 
nominated to a higher position. From this it will be clear that holding someone responsible for 
something is closely related to holding him/her accountable in the sense of being answerable 












We may thus distinguish between the concept of autonomously "being a responsible agent," 
with responsibility as a quality of the individual, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 
relational notion of "holding someone responsible" or "holding someone accountable." 
Hence, we can distinguish between being held responsible, which expresses a moral 
condemnation or moral judgements only, and being held accountable, which also implies a 
possible sanction. The subtle distinction between these two concepts is that holding someone 
accountable implies holding a person liable for the consequences of his or her actions. For 
instance, a soldier can be given responsibility for the security of a certain terrain: it is up to 
him to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure that there are no intruders. This does 
not mean that he is answerable to anyone for these measures, but that he will be blamed for 
their failure and credited for their success, i.e. "the buck stops with him." Holding someone 
responsible accordingly amounts to an assertion or requirement that he/she accept the 
responsibility which has been vested in them. This is consistent with a measure of autonomy 
or discretionary authority. As against this, holding someone accountable refers them to their 
answerability in terms of delegated authority or a given mandate which limits autonomous 
action or discretionary authority. "Holding someone responsible" is compatible with the rule 
of men, "holding someone accountable" is part of the logic of the rule of law (Mulgan, 
1993:535 536). 
There are consequently four different ways and two different senses in which we may regard 
individuals as responsible agents and in which we may hold them responsible and/or 
accountable. Within the notion of "responsible agency" we can distinguish between 1) causal 
responsibility and 2) moral responsibility. Within the notion of "holding someone 
responsible" we can distinguish between 3) the more general sense of membership and subject 
responsibility in moral communities and 4) the narrower sense of role responsibility and 
accountability in hierarchical structures. 
1.3.1.1 Causal Responsibility 
The most general sense in which an individual is causally responsible for an action is that of 
having caused an event or a state of affairs. Assigning causal responsibility is to identifY the 











think of the incident of the broken lamp and the moving company in the previous example. 
Although the employer who conducted the move may be held responsible for breaking the 
lamp, it may have fallen over and broken inside the truck during transport and thus the 
employer may not be directly or physically responsible for causing it to break. Assigning 
causal responsibility is, therefore, not only concerned with human beings or moral human 
beings as such. It is possible, for instance, for a thing or an animal to cause an event or a state 
of affairs. 
Causal responsibility is, however, not sufficient for holding individuals responsible and 
accountable. In addition to causal responsibility the latter will also require motive and 
intention. For instance, in order to say that a person is responsible for the acts that he or she 
commits, the person must not only be the decisive causal factor but also act with intention and 
a clear motive. Adriana spills the tea in her cup as she reaches for the book. Although her act 
of reaching for the book did cause the tea to spill and she therefore is the cause of the tea 
spilling, she did not intend this, so we would not hold her responsible for it. In so far as 
accountability presupposes responsibility, it would therefore not make sense to hold 
individuals accountable for everything which they physically 
cause. 
1.3.1.2 Moral Responsibility 
Moral agency is judged according to each moral community's norms and rules. At a general 
level the main conditions for moral agency are that individuals satisfy certain epistemic and 
control conditions such as being self-aware, rational, and not ignorant of the circumstances in 
which they act. These are also conditions that enable individuals to act within a society'S 
established moral guidelines (Oshana, 2001: 13280). Allocations of moral responsibility thus, 
firstly, assume a basic level of voluntary intention or free will4. 
The second assumption which moral communities make when holding individuals responsible 
is the existence of a set of shared beliefs, a common system of norms against which individual 
4 There are many important philosophical and psychological debates about free will. However this issue is 
beyond the scope of this mini-dissertation. The issue will be returned to in Chapter Four on socio-psychological 
research on human behaviour. For this discussion on moral responsibility, a certain level of human free will is a 











actions can be judged (Oshana, 2001: 13281). Moral agents are held responsible on the basic 
assumption of free will, which in turn allows moral communities to evaluate and separate 
"good" from "bad" conduct as well as "right" from "wrong" action and subsequently either 
morally blame or praise individuals' conduct (Oshana, 2001: 13282). 
Moral communities, therefore, expect individuals to know their social norms and to follow 
them. As interacting members of a community, individuals implicitly consent to being held 
responsible to the moral community of which they are regarded as members and thus to being 
subjected to moral blame or praise for their conduct. In a similar way, citizens implicitly 
consent to being held accountable to the sovereign state of which they are citizens and are 
subject to legal liability according to that state's sovereign law. 
Unlike causal responsibility, however, moral responsibility is not only judged by identifying 
the physical causal factors bearing on an event or state of affairs but also through the moral 
quality of the event, i.e. including relevant intentions and motives associated with the actor 
(Oshana, 200 I: 13280). Significantly, relevant aims and intentions may relate to complex 
sequences of actions or policies, including the participation of others as subordinates, 
functionaries or agents. A person can, therefore, be morally responsible for something without 
being the direct causal (physical) factor in bringing about an event. In other words, causal 
responsibility does not necessarily imply moral responsibility, while moral responsibility may 
also, but not necessarily, include a measure of causal responsibility. Hence, we may claim a 
commander morally responsible for the acts he orders his subordinates to execute even though 
he may not be causally responsible for executing the actions himself. Conversely, the 
subordinates have causal responsibility for the acts which they execute in compliance with the 
instructions of their superior and may even be morally responsible ifthey are to be regarded 
as independent, moral agents. 
From this it follows that there may be a trade-off between being held responsible and being 
held accountable. To the extent that a subordinate agent is accountable to superiors for his or 
her actions, this diminishes the extent to which he or she can be held morally responsible, in 
the sense of being regarded as an autonomous agent or having discretionary authority. In such 
cases the subordinate or functionary will still be morally responsible for his/her own actions, 
but the nature and extent of this moral responsibility is problematic. Conversely, in cases 











their domain, the problem of their being responsible does not arise. E.g. in a military context, 
where a soldier is prosecuted for unjustly killing civilians under the orders of a commander, 
he or she is not being held morally responsible for the will or intention to kill. Conversely, 
when the soldier is not accountable to the commander, the soldier is held responsible for 
acting with intention and will to kill targets set by the commander although he or she is not 
being held morally responsible for actions that he or she chooses to take in order to comply 
with the military target goal decided by his or her superiors. We may also apply the same 
consequences to a non-military context: in relation to the previous examples regarding the 
lecturer, we may conceive of him being accountable to the school board for teaching his 
students the curriculum, and thus he himself is not regarded as morally responsible for what 
he is teaching (the curriculum). However, in the case that he is only held responsible for 
enabling his students to pass the exam, he is held responsible for whether or not his students 
pass the exam. The lecturer is, therefore, held responsible according to the success rate of the 
end product, which is not the same as holding him morally responsible for the way in which 
or what he teaches. 
The legal doctrine of command responsibility, respondeat superior, attributes guilt to those 
responsible who did not directly commit a crime based on their hierarchical relationship as 
superiors to subordinates (Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 132). Ratner and Abrams argue that, 
under current legal trends, a superior is regarded as responsible due to the level and extent of 
his or her 1) accomplice liability in the crime (situations where he or she orders or assists in 
the commission ofthe act) and 2) omission (failing to prevent certain actions of subordinates). 
In general, the doctrine holds that a commander is accountable for the acts of subordinates if 
1) he or she knew or should have known that the subordinate had committed, or was about to 
commit the acts, and if 2) he or she did not take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent 
the acts or punish the subordinate (Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 133). 
However, the general basis of this doctrine 1) obscures the precise scope of the superior's 
liability, first of all in terms of his or her definition as a superior and, secondly, in terms ofthe 
scope of the duty as a superior (Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 133 134). For instance, in cases 
where subordinates lie to their superior or disguise or cover-up crimes committed under duty, 
it is unclear to what extent the superior should be held liable and to what extent it is the duty 
of the superior to employ extraordinary check-ups on his or her subordinates. The variety of 











regarding the outer limits of a superior's responsibility. This, furthermore, places a low 
burden on subordinates, allowing them to assert the defence that they were merely acting 
under orders. Since the precedent set by the Nuremberg trial after World War Two, the mere 
fact that a subordinate followed orders has not been a defence for a crime against humanity. It 
has generally been accepted that the complexity of certain laws and the inability of some 
(primary, low-rank) defendants to understand them may render it unjust to hold subordinates 
accountable for their actions according to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (an act is 
not a crime unless the person who committed it had prior knowledge of its illegal nature) 
(Ratner and Abrams, 2001 :135 - 136). 
Moreover, due to the social structure of authority, subordinates are, in a sense, disempowered 
as self-reflecting individuals with independent moral agency to the extent that they are 
accountable through the submission to orders. Social science research has, since the Milgram 
experiments in the early 1960s, been aware of the psychological effect authority structures 
have on individuals' sense of autonomous moral agency when acting under orders (Mixon, 
1989:9). This problem will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Three. 
A basic assumption of the criminal justice system and of the rule of law, also recognised by 
the Nuremberg trial and in the Statute of the recent International Criminal Court, is that a 
person is morally responsible and thus accountable for committing a crime unless he or she 
was acting under duress and can prove that he or she lacked moral choice of action. 
Generally, lack of moral choice is accepted if the defendant can prove that 1) there was an 
immediate threat to his or her life or physical well-being; 2) that there was no adequate way to 
avert the threat; 3) that the crime committed was not disproportionate to the threat and 4) that 
the defendant did not voluntarily bring about the situation (Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 138). 
Hence, fundamentally subordinates remain personally (thus morally) responsible and 
accountable for their own actions as moral agents except when they are acting under severe 
duress (Thompson, 1987:64). The same basic assumption of moral agency relates to holding 
individuals responsible in relation to their implied moral membership in the social community 











1.3.1.3 Membership and Subject Responsibility 
Moral judgements of responsibility are necessarily structured through the established 
conventions, institutions and procedures of the moral community concerned. What kind of 
moral judgements are made and how they are structured depends on the moral community. 
Some moral communities, such as communist, totalitarian and fundamentalist Muslim 
communities, do not make a clear distinction between private and public morality. The kind 
of moral community with which this dissertation is concerned is, however, a liberal moral 
community which makes the distinction between a private sphere subject to moral 
condemnation only, and a public sphere where sanctions and the law intervene. 
The classic liberal distinction between self-regarding personal acts and acts which concern the 
well-being of others was provided by the British philosopher J.S. Mill's harm principle in On 
Liberty (1859 in Rhees, 1991 :90). Mill argued that state or public intervention and sanction is 
only justified when individual actions cause hann to others (Rhees, 1991 :90). Mill's harm 
principle is closely related to accountability in two ways: firstly, for responsible moral agents 
all actions are subject to moral condemnation in terms of the applicable norms and 
conventions of the community, but individuals are not accountable to anyone else insofar as 
their actions concern the interests of no other person than themselves. Secondly, individuals 
are accountable for actions that are prejudicial to the interests of others and, in terms of the 
harm principle, they may be subjected to either moral censure or legal punishment for such 
actions (Rhees, 1991: 171 ). 
Mill concedes that almost all individual actions produce effects on other individuals in one 
way or another (Rhees, 1991 :91). Mill therefore makes two clear distinctions. The first 
distinction is between consensual acts between adults which are regarded as private in so far 
as they are granted acceptance by the other parties and do not affect any other (non-
consenting) individuals as distinct from acts that have not been agreed to or accepted by the 
affected parties. The second distinction is that between holding individuals accountable for 
their interference on other people's rights and on other people's interests (Rhees, 1991: 179). 
Joel Feinberg (1997: 138) attempts to make the distinction between public and private 
morality in the liberal state by distinguishing between "offensive nuisances merely" and 











partly personal, relatively trivial and offends because of the unpleasant state they produce in 
the person who feels offended. "Profound offences," on the other hand, are wholly or partly 
impersonal, grave or serious (thus more than a "nuisance") and offend because they are seen 
(as well as socially agreed and accepted) as "wrong" (Feinberg, 1997: 147 - 148). It would 
make sense to hold individuals accountable only for those offences that bear the 
characteristics of profound offences, in other words offences which violate fundamental 
individual rights, or in Mill's sense, legitimate individual interests, while merely offensive 
nuisances are subject to moral condemnation but not criminal sanction (Feinberg, 1997:160). 
This brings the discussion closer to the core of the distinction between moral responsibility 
and accountability. Mill differentiates between two ways in which individuals may be held 
responsible and/or accountable for actions affecting the rights or interests of others. Firstly, 
such individuals may be morally judged (i.e. "being held responsible") as social members of a 
moral community (moral condemnation). Secondly, such individuals may be held 
accountable as subjects of the law (legal prosecution). The following two sections will 
distinguish between two ways of holding individuals accountable. The first is in terms of the 
classical notion of hierarchical accountability and the second is the classical political notion 
of democratic accountability. 
1.3.1.4 Role Responsibility and Accountability in Hierarchical Structures 
Role responsibilities invoke special duties which are specific to the task, position or roles of 
individuals in traditional communities, for instance as parents, children, servants etc. (Romzek 
and Dubnick, 1998: 10). For instance, parenthood invokes special duties as guardians for 
children under a legal age to teach the child social norms and make sure the child does not 
violate the legal rules of the state. 
These familiar and traditionallinformal social roles with their associated responsibilities 
differ, however, from responsibilities formally conferred on individuals who serve in 
positions in complex social hierarchical organisations such as bureaucracies. Office-holders 
and functionaries take on particular role responsibilities as agents in a social structure and 











servants as being accountable to the Head of the Department for carrying out certain tasks 
assigned to them. 
The Weberian model of rational bureaucracy depicts the accountability of the classical 
hierarchical organisation as that of each agent's duties being structured in a vertical chain 
whereby each is answerable to a superior for the performance of his or her own duties. These 
duties may involve the supervision of agents lower down in the chain for which a superior 
may be responsible in addition to his or her own duties. Hierarchical accountability is 
organised inter-dependently in which each agent acts under close control of another. This 
allows for little discretion at the lowest levels. Thus accountability in hierarchical structures is 
monitored through close supervision by the next authority in command (Mulgan, 1993:356). 
The hierarchical chain of accountability diverts the moral responsibility for the outcome from 
the person who performs the act to the person in charge, which is supported by the doctrine of 
respondeat superior (the superior answers for the act). The underlying principle of the 
doctrine is that the superior should be held liable for the mistakes or crimes of his 
subordinates as a failure of exercising his or her duties as commander. Since the subordinate 
is commanded to execute an order, he or she does not have a choice to decide for him or 
herself the action with a conscious intention of the consequences, which is a basic assumption 
in holding someone responsible (Thompson, 1987:75; Ratner and Abrams, 2001:133). In 
other words, if in accordance with the principle of respondeat superior, accountability is 
vested in the superior then this must affect the moral responsibility of subordinate agents. This 
problem applies more generally to the standard of moral self-control we expect of human 
behaviour under duress. It is therefore commonly regarded as neither the duty nor the 
expectation of a soldier to morally evaluate and criticise or develop his own response in 
military situations where he or she is under a chain of command (Thompson, 1987:47). On the 
face of it, this comes close to absolving subordinate agents from moral responsibility for their 
acts. 
The problem with assigning moral individual responsibility in the modem hierarchical 
organisation is that responsibility is organised in such a way that the final responsibility for 
the outcome of an action falls on the person who stands highest in the chain of authority and 
not on the person who actually performed the act (Thompson, 1987:41). On the other hand, it 











bureaucratic organisation to be morally responsible for each action that his or her soldiers or 
subordinates have committed. The implication is that the hierarchical notion of accountability 
precludes personal and moral responsibility, which makes it impossible to hold any person in 
particular morally responsible for an outcome (Thompson, 1987:43). 
There are three characteristics of the modem hierarchical organisation that make individual 
moral responsibility impossible. First, the specialisation of separate tasks that together 
contribute to a particular outcome inhibits individuals having full knowledge of the 
organisation's activities so that those who have knowledge of a crime may not have the ability 
(influence or power) to do anything about it, whereas those who do have the ability (leaders, 
supervisors etc.) may not have the necessary insight into the actions taking place further down 
in the hierarchical chain of activities to realise that something is wrong (Thompson, 1987:69). 
For instance, the Chief administrator of a government department cannot realistically be 
expected to know of a corruption scheme at the lowest levels of his administration. 
Second, the way in which tasks are performed involves a "routinization" process through 
which the performance of routines exculpates the acting individual from the standard 
requirement of mens rea (conscious intention). This is something that accountability 
mechanisms such as criminal law normally require in order to hold someone (intentionally 
and) morally liable for an outcome that they have caused (Thompson, 1987:71). A factory 
worker packing bottles for a pharmaceutical company cannot, for instance, be expected to 
know that one of the ingredients of the medicine he or she is packing is an illegal chemical 
that causes health hazards to its users. 
At this point a further distinction between 1) internal accountability and 2) external 
accountability for an act which involves the commissioning of crime in authority structures 
can be made. External accountability refers to a bottom-up accountability whereby 
subordinates must report to their superiors on the execution of their mandates or delegated 
authority. To the extent that they do this, it implies that their superiors are morally responsible 
and detracts from their own moral responsibility as autonomous agents. Internal 
accountability is top-down: superiors may be held accountable by the wider moral and 
political community for the execution of policies which they have initiated, which is closely 











Consequently, accountability in the modern hierarchical organisation is diverted along 
external and internal lines of responsibility. With internal accountability, a subordinate is 
responsible for his or her own assigned duties, which may include the supervision of other 
subordinates under his or her command. However a subordinate is in turn accountable to the 
head of that organisation/department who is responsible for assigning the different duties and 
employing and firing workers according to their performance and qualifications. Thus the 
internal accountability is organised along a strict vertical line of responsibility. With external 
accountability, therefore, the accountability of the outcome of every action does not reside 
with the doer, but with the person who answers to external constituencies in charge. Thus the 
external accountability of the outcomes which the organisation as a whole produces is 
organised ditTerently, i.e. the leader or head of an organisation/department is not held 
personally or morally responsible for what goes on under his or her leadership, but should any 
action lead to misconduct then he or she is answerable, in other words held liable by external 
constituencies, e.g. a Minister of Parliament is accountable for his Department, but is not 
regarded as personally or morally responsible for the actions that take place in the 
Department. It is, therefore, common in liberal Western democracies for a leader to 
voluntarily assume "full responsibility" if or when serious misconduct or failure to deliver has 
been found out in his or her organisation, even ifhe or she had no direct part in them. 
However, a careful look at }vhat kind of responsibility a leader assumes reveals that holding 
individuals responsible for the outcomes of actions in the hierarchical organisation does not 
amount to personal moral responsibility. The result is that neither the leader nor the servant or 
soldier can strictly be held morally responsible. Whereas the leader is accountable, he or she 
is not morally or personally responsible for the acts of others. Conversely, the servant or 
soldier may be seen as accounting for the consequences of his or her own acts while he or she 
is relieved from being personally and morally responsible for them. 
Political accountability is another aspect of role responsibility but is more complex because it 











1.3.1.5 Political Accountability and the Dual Notion of Political Representation 
Hierarchical accountability emerged historically out of the ruler's need to delegate tasks of the 
ruling household to others. This delegation of tasks eventually grew to the granting of 
authority and discretion on behalf of the ruler. Thus bureaucratic accountability developed as 
a set of challenges facing rulers related to monitoring responsiveness, verifYing performance 
of tasks and assessing blame for accountable actions (Romzek and Dubnick, 1998 :6). 
Hierarchical accountability refers to a special kind of delegated authority, which may be 
democratic or non-democratic in nature. The basic idea of such accountability is based on the 
hierarchical model and refers to the idea that a functionary, delegation or institution with 
delegated authority is answerable to report to a superior authority on how that power is 
exercised (Robertson, 2004:3). In addition, the sovereign executive power can itselfbe held 
politically accountable. Democratic political accountability refers to the premise that elected 
government officials are granted discretionary power to act on behalf of their constituency to 
whom they in tum are accountable for the decisions that they make (Hickok, 1995:9 and 
Mulgan, 1992:531 - 532). 
The democratic notion that government is accountable to the people is relevant in two 
different senses. In one sense, an elected political agent is answerable to his or her 
constituency on behalf of whom he or she is expected to act in their best interests. On the 
other hand, a politically elected agent is bound by a definitive mandate to act according to the 
policy of the party which the agent represents. The fact that political representatives are at the 
same time acting as independent actors as well as acting in the place of others creates, 
however, a dilemma in holding political agents accountable for their acts. 
The American political philosopher, Hanna F. Pitkin (1967), named this dilemma "the dual 
concept of political representation." According to Pitkin (1967:59), the problem of holding 
political representatives accountable is related to the fact that they are both acting "instead of' 
as well as "to the benefit of' the people. The classical statement of this problem is that of the 
18th century British Parliamentarian, Edmund Burke, who in his speech to Parliament in 1774 
made a distinction between the nature of the interests with which the (British) politician is 
concerned on the one hand and, on the other, his or her simultaneous role as a delegate, acting 











under the instructions of the electors and following their views wherever possible, the former 
involves the representative acting as an independent advocate of the electors' interests, 
without necessarily following their views on how their interests should be furthered (Mulgan, 
1992:531). In other words, an elected politician is both a (bound) representative, promoting 
the interests of his or her constituency, as well as an (independent) agent, capable of 
autonomous action and judgement, acting in his or her constituency's interests (Pitkin, 
1967: 155 - 156). Ideally, these dual roles should never conflict, so that logically no 
representative can act in his or her constituency's interests contrary to the constituency's 
wishes (Pitkin, 1967: 155). However, Pitkin concedes, this conflict is an inevitable and an 
"unsolvable paradox" of political representation due to the discretionary power which 
distinguishes political action from autonomous independent action (Pitkin, 1967: 150). 
Pitkin suggests that a possible reconciliation of the two notions of representation would be to 
make possible rules for and assessments of what the political representative does and how he 
or she does it. What the representative does may then be in his or her principal's interest (as 
an agent for a political party or the state), but the way he or she does it remains responsive 
according to the principal's wishes (Pitkin, 1967 :121). 
The duality of political representation also plays itself out in the two principal roles that 
Ministers of government inhabit. They are "internally accountable" to the chief executive of 
government (the Prime Minister or President) and ultimately to Parliament. This means that 
the President or Prime Minister may remove from their positions Ministers who do not 
perform their jobs satisfactorily (Mulgan, 1993:536). A political representative may also be 
internally accountable to the political party to which he or she belongs and thus be expected to 
make decisions in line with the party's policy objectives. On the other hand, the relationship 
between the Party leadership and Ministers of Parliament to the electorate is an "external" 
one, in which the representative is expected to make decisions in the best interests of his or 
her constituents (Romzek and Dubnick, 1998:9). Therefore there is a fundamental difference 
between Ministerial accountability (internally answerable to Parliament and the Chief 
Executer) and political responsibility (externally responsible for decisions and outcomes of 
policy directives). 
The monitoring of responsiveness (to the constituency's interests) in a democratic state is 











are not re-elected (Romzek and Dubnick, 1998:9). However state agents have a special legal 
standing due to the fact that the state is invested with sovereign immunity which means that 
the state, under international law, is immune from legal process in the court of another 
sovereign. A government may in addition be immune within its own legal system (Thompson, 
1987:79). This dual immunity invokes a practical paradox in holding government officials 
accountable to the law while they are themselves the ones who make the law (Thompson, 
1987:87). This should, however, not be an obstacle in a constitutional democracy in which no 
one is above the rule of law. 
Although political agents are invested with authority to act for others in their capacity as 
representatives, they can still be held personally responsible for the decisions that they make 
and the essential impact they have on other people's lives. Political accountability and moral 
responsibility are crucial precisely because democratic representatives claim to act for others 
while also serving themselves (Walzer, 1974:76). The paradoxical nature of political action is, 
however, that when it comes to government, "doing the right thing" in utilitarian (as opposed 
to absolutist) terms often involves "morally wrong actions" when considering the best 
interests of a group of people (as opposed to a single individual) (Walzer, 1974:63). This is 
the essence of the problem named "dirty hands." Walzer argues that the problem of "dirty 
hands" in politics can at least be reduced by examining the appropriate kind of moral 
condemnation and/or punishment for the immoral acts which follow from politicians' 
decision·making power, which will enable the moral community in which and for whom the 
politician acts to set moral and legal rules for political action (Walzer, 1974:76). Walzer's 
conclusion is that the risks that politicians take in making choices and decisions on behalf of 
and in the interests of others (and themselves) should be that when they do something 
"wrong" it carries a price that the representative, when held accountable, is bound to pay 
(Walzer, 1974:82). 
According to Walzer, the moral dilemma of political action has been tackled by three 
distinctly different perspectives on political morality: the neoclassical, thc Protestant and the 
Catholic traditions (Walzer, 1974:76). The neoclassical view is posed by Machiavelli's The 
Prince (1515) in which a politician's deceit and cruelty are necessary evils and justified by the 
good results he achieves (Walzer, 1974:77). The Protestant view is represented by Max 
Weber's essay "Politics as a Vocation" (1919) in which the well-meaning politician has taken 











goals of political ends. The dilemma of the moral cost and price of his or her actions are 
fought out in an inner tension felt entirely by him or her alone (Walzer, 1974:79). Thus, it 
does not lead to any form of accountability. The Catholic tradition is illustrated by Albert 
Camus' play, The Just Assassins, set in 19th century Russia in which a group of terrorists 
accept the death penalty for having attempted to kill the very authorities which now condemn 
them to death (Walzer, 1974:80). In this way, the political actor has accepted the price to be 
paid for his or her actions and, in doing what he/she felt he/she justly had to do in order to 
reach hislher goals, he/she no longer suffers but accepts the penalties for his/her well-meaning 
intention (Walzer, 1974:80). This represents a form of accountability because, by accepting to 
submit to the social rules or laws ofthe society in which their actions took place, the actors 
accept that they are liable for their actions to that society. 
Neither of the first two traditions holds the perpetrator accountable from a moral community 
point of view; the politician is either already justified prior to acting for the ends he attempts 
to bring about (Machiavelli) or allowed to make his or her own calculation of the costs and 
benefits ofhislher actions and assumed to suffer in silence with his/her own conscience, 
which constitutes a form of moral responsibility or moral agency (Weber). The problem with 
these two pcrspecti yes is that none of them attempts to hold the pol itician responsible or 
accountable for his or her acts, Walzer argues (1974:79). In the neoclassical tradition, the 
politician acts with blanket impunity, and in the Protestant tradition "the inner suffering" of 
the politician is detennined by his own capacity for suffering as opposed to the society'S 
moral code for the cost of his actions (Walzer, 1974:81). Weber famously distinguishes 
between the civil servant's "pure ethics of absolute ends," where "the good" is striven for 
exclusively through "good means" by conscientiously following orders by superior 
authorities, and the politician's "ethics of responsibility," where every decision of the 
politician must be taken with responsibility for its consequences (Weber, 1970:95 and 126). 
However, although Weber's "ethics of responsibility" implies a certain moral responsibility of 
the politician as a moral agent, it does not imply that the politician should be held accountable 
(by anyone else but himself) for his decisions (Weber, 1970: 127). Thus, the Catholic tradition, 
according to Walzer (1974:80), offers the perspective that most closely matches the need for 
the moral community to hold any perpetrator that infringes on its norms responsible. 
According to Walzer this offers the best solution to the dilemma of moral and political 
accountability because it upholds the idea that political action carries responsibility. By being 











community (in Camus' case, the rules of the authorities against which the dissidents are 
rebelling), the politician proves to the wider moral community that he not only takes this 
responsibility seriously but is also willing to pay the price for the consequences (in other 
words subject him- or herself to the sanction predetermined by the society's rules) (Walzer, 
1974:81). 
What makes a politician accountable, argues Walzer, is the consequence of the immoral acts 
by politicians being I) socially expressed (as opposed to confined to the individual's 
consciousness) and 2) socially limited (as opposed to left to the endless and indiscriminate 
suffering of the individual conscience) (Walzer, 1974:79). 
1.4 Guilt Charged from Without and Guilt Charged from \Vithin: 
The Four Notions of Guilt 
The German philosopher, Karl Jaspers5, writing in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, explored the boundaries between the political and legal social expressions ofthe 
notion of "guilt" and the personal moral and metaphysical transformation of the realisation of 
guilt in post-conflict societies after mass atrocities. 
His essay, "The Question of German Guilt" (1947), is particularly relevant to the previous 
distinction between the ways in which moral, legal and political responsibility are linked. It 
deals with the relevant senses in which one may hold individuals accountable, and in 
particular with the relation between moral agency and holding a moral agent responsible. 
[n summary, Jaspers argues that there are four notions of guilt, which are separated and 
interlinked and meet with different consequences. These are: 1) criminal guilt, 2) political 
guilt, 3) moral guilt and 4) metaphysical guilt (Jaspers, 1947:31 - 32). 
5 First a medical doctor, Jaspers' extensive research in psychopathology led to his post as Professor of 
Philosophy at Heidelberg University, from which he was forced to resign in 1935. He remained silently opposed 
to the Nazi regime and returned in 1945 to a position as one of the centralleaders of the new liberal intellectual 
elite in Germany after the end of the war (Introduction, The Question of German Guilt. translated by E. B. 











1.4.1 Criminal Guilt 
Criminal guilt is individual guilt for individual acts that can be objectively proven and which 
violate unequivocal laws. This concept of guilt is thus related to the sense of legal liability 
discussed above according to which individuals are subject to the rule oflaw. The 
detennination of criminal guilt rests upon the jurisdiction of a court of law through fonnal 
proceedings based on the assumption that the individual acted under his or her own free will 
(Jaspers, 1947:31). Criminal guilt is met with punishment (Jaspers, 1947:36). 
1.4.2 Political Guilt 
Political guilt relates to the deeds of statesmen for which they, as well as the citizenry of the 
state, are guilty (Jaspers, 1947:31). Political guilt is shared by the constituency represented by 
the political actor. However, the constituency does not share his or her moral or criminal guilt 
(Jaspers, 1947:61 62). Jaspers thus makes a crucial distinction between collective liability 
for the actions ofthe state and individual legal liability and moral responsibility for the 
actions of individuals. 
1.4.3 Moral Guilt 
Moral guilt can only be attributed to the individual before his/her own conscience. Unlike 
individual criminal guilt, individual moral guilt can only be charged from within an 
individual's consciousness (Jaspers, 1947:32). In tenns oftlle previous discussion, Jaspers' 
notion of moral guilt is similar to the previous notion of responsible agency. Thus in Jaspers' 
tenn moral guilt only exists within and for individuals capable of self-reflective analysis and 
conscious thinking (Jaspers, 1947:63). Moral guilt may result in repentance and change, 
which in turn have direct implications for the individual's course of action and way oflife 
(Jaspers, 1947:36). In this way, moral guilt is closely linked to political and criminal guilt, 












1.4.4 Metaphysical Guilt 
Metaphysical guilt is the lack of unconditional solidarity with human beings so that, when one 
individual's human dignity is disgraced by another, every individual who witnesses it or has 
knowledge of it is guilty of not preventing it from happening (Jaspers, 1947:32). Jaspers 
argues that, because metaphysical bruilt is connected to our very membership of the human 
race, it is inevitable, just as membership of a moral community and citizenship of a state. 
Jaspers' sense of metaphysical guilt is influenced by the idea of accountability to a higher 
law, that of God, which presupposes a shared, innate sense of responsibility for human 
consciousness (Jaspers, 1947:75). 
J aspers distinguishes between four different senses of guilt, i.e. ( 1-4 above) which involve 
two essential kinds of relation: guilt as charged "from without" (a moral community) and guilt 
as charged "from within" (an individual's conscience) (Jaspers, 1947:39). Guilt charged from 
without relates to that kind of guilt which is attributed to individuals either as subjects to the 
law or as citizens ofthe state in which they reside. The former kinds of guilt involving 
violation of norms that the moral community sanctions through a legal system lead to 
criminal guilt (Jaspers, 1947:39 40). The latter kinds of guilt relate to the consequences of 
conflicts in which the state engages with other states and may result in the political guilt of all 
the citizens of that state due to their implicit liability as subjects6 (Jaspers, 1947:42). 
Guilt charged from within relates to the kinds of guilt that can only be felt by the individual 
itself through his or her moral consciousness by acknowledging 1) the responsibility for his or 
her own actions and 2) the realisation that individuals have a common responsibility to the 
wider human community. The former self-realisation through the discipline of conscientious 
self-scrutiny of ones own responsibility for own actions leads to moral guilt. The latter 
unlimited solidarity with other human beings and the realisation of the common responsibility 
for preventing injustice leads to metaphysical guilt (Jaspers, 1947:78 - 79). 
6 Jaspers' political guilt should, however, be carefully distinguished as political guilt in liberal democratic states 
where citizens have participatory rights (such as free elections) in the governing of the state, as opposed to 
totalitarian regimes or dictatorships where citizens have no effective power in the governing of the state (Jaspers, 











Jaspers argues that individuals can only be held accountable for guilt that can be charged from 
without, in other words in relation either to the law or to the power of other nation states to 
impose their rule on the defeated state after conflict (Jaspers, 1947:73). Moral guilt by itself is 
not sufficient to hold an individual to account to others because it can only be judged and 
dealt with on an individual basis (Jaspers, 1947:74). This distinction is relevant to the 
previous distinction between holding someone responsible as an essentially relational concept 
(to someone else or according to some criteria outside oneself), on the one hand, and, on the 
other, being responsible (responsible agency) as an essential characteristic of a moral and 
rational agent and a prerequisite for holding someone responsible. Morally and 
metaphysically, the individual can only judge him- or herself, since moral consciousness is a 
quality which resides in the individual and not in a collective group of individuals (Jaspers, 
1947040). Jaspers' distinction thus relates back to the previous analysis where it was argued 
that a fundamental prerequisite for holding individuals responsible and accountable is the 
assumption of individuals' moral independence as autonomous actors. 
Thus, individuals can be held accountable by the moral community in which they reside 
through a system of law or by another moral community after violation of its right not to have 
its sovereignty interfered with. This distinction between holding individuals criminally 
accoltntable through power on the one hand and by political means on the other relates to the 
previous distinction between "the rule of law" and "the rule of men." 
Jaspers' notion of political guilt differs from that of political accountability discussed above in 
the sense that the latter applies to individual political agents and their accountability relation 
to either their party leadership or Parliament or the wider constituency whereas Jasper's 
notion is similar to the notion of liability responsibility in which an individual is necessarily 
liable as a member of a moral community. This is similar to Walzer and Pitkin's notions of 
the political actor being liable to the electorate as well as being held morally responsible. In 
other words, as citizen members of a political state, all citizens share the same responsibilities 
and are thus in this sense guilty and liable for the affairs of "their state." Jasper's notion of 
political guilt thus rests on the principle of sovereignty: that the citizens of a state are the 
ultimate source of authority for the governing of the state, hence "the people" (elecorate) are 











Political guilt, argues Jaspers, is also caused by failing to be aware of the inherent power 
relationships in all societies which require a moral individual to support the power which 
strives for what is morally right (Jaspers, 1947:34). Therefore, in a strict sense, political 
liability cannot be evaded, just like someone who is a member of a community is by 
implication subject to its norms although he or she may not agree with or join political 
actions7 (Jaspers, 1947:61-62). 
Writing specifically in the context of Germany's immediate situation post-World War Two, 
the consequence of political liability, argues Jaspers, are (in the case of an inter-state war as 
that of World War Two) entirely decided by the victor who may charge the defeated state 
with reparation costs, loss or restriction of political power and rights or may even choose the 
destruction, deportation or extermination of the vanquished state's citizens (Jaspers, 1947:36). 
Thus, whereas the legally liable is subject to the rule of law, the politically liable is subject to 
the force and power ofthe victor, i.e. the rule of men (Jaspers, 1947:37). 
Jaspers' notion of political guilt is, therefore, closely related to the notion of "victor's justice," 
a term which has been used to describe the Nuremberg international military trial of the major 
German war criminals held by the Allied forces after the war because it served accountability 
to the law as well as accountability to the victors for the war. 
Jaspers' notion of political liability subject to the victor's force and choice would, however, 
not be appropriate for the particular moral community engaged with rectifying past wrongs 
based on the respect for (equal) human rights with which this mini-dissertation is concerned. 
A moral community that values human rights will seek to address past violations through a 
common agreement to rectify past wrongs or through a system oflaw that is applied equally 
to all as opposed to discriminate decisions by the victors of a conflict. 
7 Jaspers' notion of political guilt is therefore particularly relevant to the context of post-conflict societies in 
which the atrocities have taken place under a democratically elected regime whose crimes were legal at the time 
of commission and where most of the population has participated or collaborated (similar to communist 
regimes). Paradoxically, however, those who are wilIing to struggle for justice may face the impossible choice of 
risking their lives for a noble cause that is not going to have any effect, or to comply with a corrupt regime in 
order to stay alive (Jaspers, 1947:71 - 72). None of the two courses of action may escape political liability, 
though, as with Camus' "The Just Assasins" discussed above, the former course of action may alleviate the 











The next chapter will review the historical context in which the Nuremberg trial took place 
and investigate the implications it had for holding individuals accountable for gross human 
rights violations. 
Chapter Two 
The Nuremberg Precedent - Accountability in Transitional Contexts 
2.1 A Brief History of Individual Accountability for Gross Human Rights Violations 
The idea that government agents could be held accountable for atrocities against the citizens 
under its rule was, until the 20th century, considered to be contrary to the very principle of 
sovereign government (Held, 1995:75). The traditional conception of the sovereign ruler 
included the discretionary power to grant amnesties, which was typically used to protect state 
agents and ensure their impunity to the law (Slye, 2002:175). The Westphalian convention, 
dating back to 1648 and the end of the Thirty Years War, established sovereign states as the 
creators and sole holders oflegitimate law against which no other party, except another 
sovereign state, could make a claim (Held, 1995:75). Under the influence of the positivist 
school of thought, the purpose of international law was to treat the sovereign state as its 
primary subject and to regulate the relations between sovereign states. Individuals were 
unprotected as subjects of international law , except in relations to acts by governments against 
other sovereign nationals as this was seen as an affront by one sovereign against another 
(Ratner and Abrams, 2001 :4). The overall historical pattern was therefore that governments 
and their agents could act against their own citizens with effective immunity to the law8. 
The second attempt to impose legal accountability for war crimes and political atrocities on 
political and military leaders took place after World War I just prior to the negotiations of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919 (the first attempt was the British handling of Napoleon 
Bonaparte in 1815 after the Hundred Days War (Bass, 2002:37 - 38).) A Commission of 
Responsibilities with representation by international lawyers from the British, French, Italian, 
Japanese and American states proposed the criminal prosecution of the German Kaiser 
8 The only considerable exception to this pattern was the attempts to abolish slavery, though not for its offence 











Wilhelm II and that it should be the duty of Germany to prosecute its political and military 
leaders for war crimes (Marrus, 1997:3). However, the provisions under the Versailles Treaty 
never materialised. The Allies' lack of military action opened the way to a successful refusal 
by the German government to subject its own leaders and soldiers to the humiliation of war 
crimes trials in their own courts and the Netherlands' refusal to extradite the Kaiser. The 
result was thus that the few trials being held in Leipzig were ineffective; the defendants were 
either acquitted or let off with light sentences (Bass, 2002:59). 
The lessons of these failed attempts to hold political and military leaders accountable for war 
crimes and other political atrocities were brought back into the fore with the ending of World 
War II, when the Allied forces faced anew the imperative question of what to do with the 
surrendered war criminals. The unprecedented extent and inhuman nature of the atrocities 
involved in the mass crimes of war and the genocide of 6 million Jews generated a need for an 
international condemnation of and reckoning with the Nazi affront against liberal values, 
humanitarian ideals and the rule of law (Taylor, 1992:21). This need was rooted in a general 
repugnance and moral outrage against Nazism as a political force which had implemented 
international policies of systematic mass murder and disregard for human life (Marrus, 
1997: 1). The efforts to bring the responsible leaders and their henchmen to account for their 
actions culminated in an International Military Tribunal set in Nuremberg (lMT) during 1945 
- 1946, which still remains the historical paradigm for holding individuals, including political 
leaders and state agents, accountable under the law for their contribution to morally 
reprehensible crimes. 
The key principle established by the Nuremberg Tribunal was that individuals remain 
accountable for their actions despite any alleged claim that they were acting under orders 
from a higher authority in the commission of crimes, regardless of whether they are 
government agents or acting under the supremacy of state law. Although the Nuremberg trial 
has been criticized as "victor's justice" (there were no similar sanctions taken against the 
victors of the war for their gross human rights violations, for instance the British bombing 
attacks on German cities and the notorious atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki which 











remains that it was the first ever serious attempt to create a new international order with a 
commitment to universal human rights and world peace9 (Shklar, 1986: 155 - 157). 
Following the watershed of this development, two major changes took place. First, 
international law began to hold individuals criminally accountable for gross human rights 
atrocities and violations ofthe laws of war which previously had been attributed to the entity 
of the state. Secondly, a new area of international human rights began to develop which 
prescribed limits upon a government's conduct towards its own citizens, effectively limiting 
the previously thought unlimited legal power of sovereign states in domestic law (Ratner and 
Abrams, 2001 :5). In this way Nuremberg's profound impact on international law created a 
precedent for states in transition to democracy, allowing the successor regimes under 
international law to prosecute and punish leaders and official agents of its previous 
government for gross human rights violations. Although there are some serious practical, 
political and legal impediments to applications ofthe Nuremberg model (which will receive 
more attention in Chapter Four), the overall effect ofthe Nuremberg trial was that it endorsed 
the right of individuals to hold the previous regime accountable through criminal prosecution 
for acts of gross human rights violations (Wise, 1999:64). 
In an important sense, the continuing significance and relevance of the Nuremberg model of 
accountability is the topic of this dissertation. The Nuremberg trials established the 
prosecution and punishment of individual perpetrators as a historical precedent and model for 
holding individuals accountable for gross violations of human rights. So much so that it is 
often assumed that the retributive justice of criminal prosecution is the only meaningful sense 
in which individuals may be held accountable for gross violations of human rights and that 
amnesty is ipso facto equated with impunity. This dissertation's aim is to examine whether 
criminal accountability under the law is the only meaningful sense of accountability or 
whether, in certain circumstances, conditional amnesty may present a possible alternative. 
This amounts to an investigation of the continuing relevance of the Nuremberg model for 
dealing with gross violations of human rights in post-conflict societies in the last half of the 
20th century. Thus, this chapter will examine the following question: 
'l The 20th century has seen the proliferation of international tribunals such as the ICTY. the ICTR and the ICC 
that are significantly different from the IMT at Nuremberg. The Nuremberg trial is in the context of this 
dissertation discussed in relation to its contribution of condemning gross human rights violations and promoting 
human rights which is consistent with these later developments. This general trend or tradition holds that 











What are the relevant precedents and implications of the Nuremberg trial for 
post-conflict societies in holding individuals accountable for gross human rights 
violations? 
2.2 The Creation of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
The Nuremberg trial originated in a joint declaration on German atrocities by the political 
leaders of the Allied forces - i.e. Britain (Churchill), the United States (Roosevelt) and the 
Soviet Union (Stalin) on behalf of the 32 United Nations member states at the Moscow 
Conference on November 151 in 1943. This stated that German officers and members of the 
Nazi party responsible for atrocities, massacres and executions during the war would be sent 
back to the countries in which these crimes took place to be judged by "the new, liberated 
governments" (Wright, 1972:4). The Moscow Declaration stated that "[t]he major criminals 
whose offences have no particular geographical localisation will be punished by the Allies." 
These offences referred specifically to those committed systematically on a large, 
international scale (Wright, 1972:4). The actual trial was made possible by the total surrender 
of Germany on May 7th 1945 (Meltzer, 1999:20). The proposal to set up an International 
Military Tribunal drawn up by the Chief of Council for the United States, Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, was signed at the London Agreement on August 8th 1945 by the United States, 
Britain, France and the Soviet Union (acting on behalf of the United Nations). The London 
Agreement included the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which established the 
procedure and the jurisdiction of the tribunal (Wright, 1972:5). 
The Charter provided for a fair trial of22 defendants lO (including Goering, Hitler's Deputy, 
and top military leaders) with the right to their own defence, to give any explanation and to 
present evidence to support their defence against the charges (Wright, 1972: 15). Seven were 
sentenced to prison terms varying from ten years to lifetime and the remaining twelve were 
sentenced to hang (Wright, 1972:6). All those sentenced to hang were found guilty of the 
to Of the 22 defendants the Tribunal decided that one of the defendants (Gustav Krupp Bohlen) was too sick to 
be tried and one defendant (Robert Ley) had committed suicide while in custody (Wright. 1972:5 - 6). Thus, of 











most serious charge, crimes against humanity. The general significance and implications of 
the trial will be discussed in the following section. 
2.3 The Charges and their Implications 
The jurisdiction of the tribunal covered the following three charges committed by persons, 
either as individuals or as members of organisations, as defined under Article 6 (cited by 
Wise, 1999:55): 
6 a) Crimes Against Peace: 
"Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy. " 
6 (b) War Crimes: 
"Violations of the laws and customs of war" such as "murder, ill-treatment or 
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of 
or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons 
on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder or public or private property, )'vanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military 
necessity. " 
6 (c) Crimes against Humanity: 
Defined under Article 6 (c) of the Charter as "murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any 
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, ),vhether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where perpetrated. " 
Understanding the impact of the Nuremberg trial on the concept of accountability in the post-
Nuremberg era requires recognition of the extent to which the notions of crimes against 











established principles in international law and/or the Just War tradition or amounted to the 
invention of new violations and thus the generation of new and diverse precedents (Teitel, 
1999:44 - 45). Nuremberg's historic innovation was threefold. First of all, it did not only hold 
soldiers or officers accountable for war crimes but also prosecuted government members and 
other state agents. Secondly it included acts committed against a government's own nationals 
in addition to those committed against civilians in occupied territory. And thirdly, it held that 
such crimes were considered a matter of international concern - including times of peace 
(Wise, 1999:55, 57 and 59). 
Teitel argues that the Nuremberg trial contributed to a reconceptualisation of accountability 
for human rights violations by shifting the focus in three main areas: 1) from collective to 
individual responsibility, 2) from national to international jurisdiction and 3) from 
humanitatian law applying only to situations of war to that which includes times of peace 
(Teitel, 1999:53). The significance of this reconceptualisation is best understood in the 
historical context in which it took place, i.e. in a state-centred worldview that supported the 
principles and rules ofthe Westphalian system. This upheld the idea of a society of states 
constitutes the fundamental principle of world politics according to which any intervention in 
a state's treatment of its own nationals was considered a serious violation of that state's 
sovereignty (Wise, 1999:60; Held, 1995:75). With respect to 3), it is safe to say that although 
the charge of crimes against humanity was limited to apply only in connection with war under 
the Nuremberg Charter, international customary law and international treaties have since then 
nevertheless widely accepted that accountability for crimes against humanity applies in 
peacetime as weill I (Wise, 1999:63). The implication ofthese shifts was that international law 
was no longer regarded as a body oflaw pertaining exclusively to states but also applied 
directly to responsible individuals, even to state agents who under the previous notion of 
absolute sovereignty could count on immunity from the law (Wise, 1999:64). This led, 
moreover, to pressures to entrench citizenship rights not sufficiently provided for by 
traditional international law in a new framework of contemporary international humanitarian 
law applicable to all world citizens (Held, 1995:223). It is to these two important 
reconceptualisations of international law that we will now tum to discuss in greater detail: 1) 
II This may thus be an instance where the actual procedure and judgement of the Nuremberg Tribunal differ 
from precedents set by it. The Genocide Convention accepted the crime of genocide to apply in peacetime as 
well, though there has been controversy about crimes against humanity applying in peacetime, for instance in the 












individuals as legal subjects under the law and 2) state agents as individually accountable for 
gross human rights atrocities. 
2.3.1 Legal Accountability 
The kind of accountability sought by the Allied victors was not political or moral but legal 
accountability, invoking criminal punishment (Teitel, 1999:45). However, it was the moral 
and political impact of criminal prosecution which led to the final decision of the Allies to 
deal with the Nazi regime though law. Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of War from 1940 to 
1945, argued that the Allies had three different courses available to them after capturing the 
Nazi leaders: release, summary execution or trial (Stimson, 1972: 114). While re1ease was 
unthinkable, summary executions had been advocated by many, particularly the British 
government. Despite strong popular support for the option of summary execution, this 
solution was not chosen in the end because it was precisely the kind of "justice" the Nazi 
regime itself had chosen. In order to not only morally condemn but also distance themselves 
ffOm Nazi justice, the Allies eventually agreed on a judicial procedure, and thus on 
prosecution and trials, in order to "give dignity and method to the ordinary conscience of 
mankind" (Stimson, 1972:115). This was, as Justice Jackson's commented, "one of the most 
significant tributes Power has ever paid to Reason" (Jackson quoted in Stimson, 1972:115). 
Thus the Nuremberg trial constituted a marked shift from the earlier distinction between the 
rule of men, where it could be difficult to distinguish justice from vengeance, and the rule of 
law, where accountable justice is sought. Jackson remarked on the importance ofthis shift in 
his opening speech at the trial: 
The former high station of these defendants, the nove1ty of their acts, and the 
adaptability of their conduct to provoke retaliation make it hard to distinguish between 
the demand for a just and measured retribution, and the unthinking cry for vengeance 
which arises from the anguish of war. It is our task, as far as possible, to draw the line 
between the two. We must never forget that the record on which we judge these 
defendants today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow. 
(Selection of Jackson's opening speech reprinted in Baird (ed.), 1972:22 - 23) 
The Nuremberg tribunal established the precedent that crimes against humanity and crimes 











agents while accountability for the crimes of citizens of a state were no longer confined within 
national, sovereign borders but constituted an international or universal matter. Thus, the 
Nuremberg trials implicitly introduced the principle of universal jurisdiction for crimes 
against humanity (Teitel, 1999:50; Wright, 1972:35). By charging the Nazi leaders for crimes 
against humanity, and by doing so through a criminal prosecution based on due process, the 
trial at Nuremberg also set important legalistic precedents and standards for subsequent trials 
and for treating similar crimes and their perpetrators (although no Allied forces or government 
agents were ever tried) (Baird, 1972: 19 and 23). 
2.3.2 Individual accountability 
The Nuremberg tribunal's understanding of accountability for gross human rights violations 
represents a historical shift from the old notion of collective or state sovereignty to a notion of 
individual accountability (Teitel, 1999:47). This was a significant departure from the 
prevailing international law, which had viewed acts of individual government agents as being 
immune from any law, protected by the principle of the sovereign state as the sole holder of 
legitimate law (Wise, 1999:59). In relation to military organisation, the hierarchical notion 
that responsibility rests with the superior, otherwise known as the principle of respondeat 
superior or "command responsibility," could no longer be used as a defence by subordinates 
in the context of following orders (Teitel, 1999:47). Hence, the significance of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal's conception of individual accountability is reflected in the result that two eentral 
defences to culpability were eliminated: 1) acts of state (state immunity) and 2) due obedience 
defences (superior orders) (Teitel, 1999:48; Ratner and Abrams, 2001:6 - 7). 
Article 8 of the IMT Charter stated that superior orders were prohibited as legal defence to the 
charges brought against the defendants 12 (Dinstein, 1965: 147). This completely ruled out the 
previously accepted defence of respondeat superior for war crimes according to which the 
subordinate soldier could plead not guilty for having committed an act under orders by a 
superior commander in charge (Wright, 1972:37 and Dinstein, 1965: 136). The prosecution of 
the defendants was based on the principles of "manifest illegality" and "personal knowledge." 
The manifest illegality principle made the proviso that the execution of an obviously criminal 
12 For an extensive examination and analysis of the prosecution and the defence arguments on this subject in the 











order does not exonerate one from criminal responsibility (Dinstein, 1965: 128). The personal 
knowledge principle was that a soldier who carried out an act without an order would be 
punished ifhe had prior knowledge of its illegality (Dinstein, 1965: 134). The implication of 
these principles was, however, that lack of acquaintance with the law would help preclude 
offenders from criminal conviction. This was criticised by the council of defence for the SD 
(The Security Service Branch) on the grounds that it made it possible for an offender who 
acted without an order to plead mistake of law whereas an offender who acted under orders 
would be denied the excuse of obedience to orders (Dinstein, 1965: 134 - 135). However, the 
prosecution relied on absolute liability for the manifest illegality of acts to show that the 
excuse of obedience to orders was not valid (Dinstein, 1965: 144). This line of argument was 
accepted in the judgement of the tribunal, which also ruled out the "FUhrerprinzip," the 
argument that Hitler's command had been the only legitimate law of the Gennan Reich and 
that the d~fendants thus acted on compulsion (Dinstein, 1965:144). However, the judgement 
of the Nuremberg trial stated that superior orders were not relevant ill relation to criminal guilt 
for crimes against humanity but may be taken into account in mitigation of punishment when 
moral choice was impossible (Dinstein, 1965: 147).13 In practice the IMT established the 
precedent for intemational humanitarian law that a crime against humanity cannot be 
defended on the grounds that it was committed by a subordinate following orders l4 (Ratner 
and Abrams, 2001: 136). 
The Nuremberg tribunal also defined individual accountability in terms of collective 
categories of membership in three criminalised organisations: the Gestapo, the SS and the 
Leadership Corps. Based on American law of conspiracy, the tribunal created a mechanism 
for linking individual and organisational responsibility by determining the criminality of 
organisations making up the Nazi regime on the grounds of a single set of proceedings of the 
leadership (Teitel, 1999:47). However, membership of these criminal organisations would 
only serve as grounds for prosecution if it had been voluntary and the alleged member had 
!3 Although no provision for a moral choice test was made in the Charter and no further specification was spelled 
out in the judgement. according to Dinstein (1965: 149) the French translation of the judgement provides more 
clarity in the specification of "no moral choice" to mean "no moral liberty" and "impaired faculty of choice" 
although controversy about the interpretation of the judgement on this issue remains 13 (Dinstein, 1965: 152). 
14 However, by logical implication. according to the principles of nul/urn crimen sine lege (no crime without the 
presence of law) and mens rea (criminal consciousness), the Nuremberg precedent of disallowing superior 
orders as a defence against accountability for crimes against humanity is in conflict with the implications of 
these two basic principles which prohibit the retroactive application of criminal law and ignorance of the law as 
defence if the defendant could not have reasonably known the illegal nature of the act (Ratner and Abrams, 











knowledge of the organisation's criminal objectives. In the follow-up trials, these precedents 
were used to "bootstrap" individuals into convictions based on membership in classified 
criminal organisations. Widespread post-war de-nazification policies also used purges of ex-
members and collaborators of Nazi organisations from employment in the new state as legal 
punishment. By prosecuting and purging ex-members of non-state organisations, the 
Nuremberg IMT affirmed the principle that citizen members are liable with respect to state 
action15 (Teitel, 1999:48). This principle is relevant to the previous discussion of norms 
imposed on the individual moral agent as a member of a moral community16. Such 
membership is a prerequisite for any moral community to claim accountability of a moral 
agent for his or her actions, and serves as a ground on which moral agents may be called to 
account for their acts whenever they contravene the morals of the community in which they 
live. Hence the Nuremberg notion of relating individual accountability to collective 
responsibility illustrates the previously discussed notions of a shared political responsibility 
as citizen (to the state) and an individual moral duty as a moral agent (to a moral 
community) . 
These duties and responsibilities, specifically founded by a world dominion of liberal-
democratic states, were further internationalised and standardised through the establishment 
of the United Nations in 1945, which encompassed the Nuremberg's reconceptualisation of 
individual accountability under international humanitarian law. The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948) marked an irreversible change in how individuals worldwide would be 
seen as world citizens, bearers of rights but also accountable as subjects. Henceforth 
everyone, including state agents, was considered directly liable for his or her human rights 
atrocities by virtue of being a member of "the (moral) world community of individuals" 
according to liberal and democratic norms17 (Ratner and Abrams, 2001 :7; Wise, 1999:65). 
Thus the Declaration entailed new duties and responsibilities for governments as well as 
individuals in the post-Nuremberg context, one of whose most controversial precedents would 
be the limit to sovereign immunity. 
15 The American follow-up trials moved to incorporate elites supporting the Nazi regime, such as the business 
sector and professionals (Teitel, 1999:48). 
16 See Chapter One 1.3.1.3: Membership and subject responsibility. 
17 This precedent was stated by the U.N. War Crimes Commission in 1948 (Ratner and Abrams, 2001:7). It 
should be noted here that, although this "world community" was perceived as the entire world, it more 
specifically reflected the ideology of liberal, democratic states and would thus exclude other world views, such 











2.4 The Legacy of the Nuremberg Precedent 
It would be nearly 50 years after Nuremberg before individuals were again prosecuted by an 
international tribunal for human rights violations (the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Fonner Republic of Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1994) (Wise, 1999:63). This illustrates the inaction 
and unwillingness of governments to prosecute and punish human rights violations in the last 
half of the 20th century (Ratner and Abrams, 2001:8 and 331). It also illustrates the continuing 
hold of the traditional Westphalian framework based on the assumption of state sovereignty in 
international law 17. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War brought a resurrection of the 
democratic and liberal ideals underlying the Nuremberg precedent. 
Two distinct developments spurred a worldwide awareness and demand for protection of 
human rights: on the one hand the fonnation of international criminal tribunals in response to 
the genocides in the Fonner Republic of Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early 1990s and, on 
the other hand, a worldwide series of transitions to democracy in which accountability for past 
human rights violations were pressed for. 
The genocides in the fonner Republic of Yugoslavia and Rwanda in the early 1990s prompted 
worldwide support among governments to seek criminal accountability of the perpetrators, 
which led to the establishment of two international tribunals (the ICTY in 1994 and the ICT 
for Rwanda in 1994). The creation of a pennanent international criminal court (the ICC), 
signed by 120 nations in Rome in 1998 and ratified in April 2002 by the required number of 
60 states, reflects the pinnacle of a growing body of international humanitarian laws and 
institutions at the turn of the 21 st century (Ratner and Abrams, 2001: 8-9). 
Contrary to this development the transitions from autocratic rule to some fonn of democracy 
beginning in South America in the early 1980s, following on the break-up of communism in 
Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and extending to parts of Africa, Central America and Asia 
from the early 1990s, were notably characterised by a general state practice of granting and 
enforcing amnesties in apparent opposition against this development in the Post Cold War era 
(Slye, 2002: 176). 
17 A major exception concerned South African apartheid, which was declared a crime against humanity by the 











These transitions were enabled though the mobilisation of human rights movements in civil 
society and, in keeping with the Nuremberg precedent, demanding that the former regimes are 
held to account for their past violations of human rights (Falk, 2001: 126). However, these 
regime changes also brought new obstacles for states seeking accountability for past human 
rights crimes. 
These obstacles are particular to intra-state post-conflict situations (as opposed to inter-state 
conflicts) where the previous regime still demonstrates its power over the military and the 
oncoming political leadership. A typical way in which previous governments have used their 
legal power and physical force is by blocking accountability measures against them, either by 
enacting self-amnesty laws, which ban the new regime from future prosecution for any past 
crimes, or by way of negotiating an amnesty through a compromise with the new regime 
before stepping down (stye, 2002:240 241). 
First of all, the granting of such state amnesties to state agents who had perpetrated gross 
human rights violations was in direct conflict with the Nuremberg precedent and the basic 
principles of the new international humanitarian law because it blocked all attempts to seek 
accountability for past human rights crimes and atrocities. 
Secondly, the recent development of conditional amnesties, accompanied by a public 
investigative inquiry to disclose the facts of past human rights violations, raises the question 
whether such conditional amnesties can amount to a form of accountability which publicly 
acknowledges the violations that took place even if they provided indemnity against 
prosecution and punishment for these human rights violations (Slye, 2002:246 - 247). The 
further question thus arises whether this form of conditional amnesty can meet the democratic 
and liberal ideals underlying the Nuremberg precedent, and ultimately whether a conditional 
amnesty can be compatible with the accountability sought through prosecution and 
punishment in the Nuremberg ethos. This is the specific focus of this dissertation. A closer 
investigation of what practical consequences the obstacles to prosecution and punishment in 
the recent transitions to democracy have had on the Nuremberg precedent will be returned to 
in Chapter Four, together with a specific analysis of the normative objectives required by 











In the following chapter individual accountability in relation to "crimes of obedience" (i.e. 
gross human rights violations executed in response to the obligation of following orders in 
authority structures) will be investigated. This discussion will specifically focus on post-
Holocaust socio-psychological research, which has informed a new understanding of the way 
in which individual moral autonomy is obscured through authoritative structures and norm-
systems. It will, furthermore, review the Argentine Due Obedience Law as a legal framework 
for taking crimes of obedience into account when holding individuals accountable for the 
mass execution of gross human rights violations. 
The context of this inquiry is the recent South African amnesty conditions for granting 
amnesty for gross human rights violations with political objectives. This is a controversial 
contradiction of the Nuremberg precedent that obedience to orders is not an excuse for 
individual accountability for human rights violations. The South African amnesty conditions 
may therefore provide a new precedent regarding individual accountability. Whether this will 












Crimes of Obedience: Individual Moral Autonomy under Authority Structures 
3.1 The Nuremberg Precedent and Social Science Research: 
Conflicting Frameworks for Due Obedience 
The Nuremberg IMT established the dominant precedent in international humanitarian law 
that due obedience is not acceptable as a justification for crimes against humanity. 
The Nuremberg precedent based its due obedience model on the implicit assumption that 
individuals as moral agents remain capable of autonomous action under authority structures 
and that they may accordingly be held responsible and accountable for crimes of obedience. 
This assumption of effective moral autonomy in authority structures has been challenged by 
the outcomes of relevant social science research over the following decades, starting with 
Milgram's "obedience experiments" in the 1960s. 
Milgram and other socio-psychological researchers into crimes of obedience have 
demonstrated that it cannot simply be assumed that ordinary individuals are capable of 
autonomous moral agency under authority structures I 8. Social science of this kind thus raise 
fundamental questions as to how due obedience is effectively constructed in relation to 
authority. 
In the light of this and the Nuremberg precedent of individual accountability for crimes of 
humanity, this chapter will be concerned with the implications of social science research for 
individual responsibility and accountability for crimes of obedience. 
The outcomes of the socio-psychology research of Milgram and others into crimes of 
obedience demonstrate that the majority of individuals is not as capable of autonomous moral 
agency in authority structures as assumed by the Nuremberg precedent. 
1.' Kelman and Hamilton (1989), Sabini and Silver (1982). Mixon (1989). For a comparative study of obedience 











Nevertheless, from a moral and criminal law perspective these empirical findings regarding 
the prevalence of crimes of obedience under authority structures do not justify them. A quote 
from Sabini and Silver's research on crimes of obedience illustrate this point clearly: 
The task of making something understandable is to make us see how it could have 
happened by showing how it is akin to something we can already grasp. There is a 
tendency to slide from understanding to excusing. We are accustomed to think that 
once we have understood how someone came to do something, we can forgive. In this 
case, we cannot allow understanding to mislead us to excuse or forgive. [their italics] 
(Silver and Sabini, 1982:87) 
Taken together, this poses a serious dilemma: on the one hand the social research findings on 
crimes of obedience do not justify them; on the other hand, these social research findings are 
evidently relevant to the force of the Nuremberg model, which cannot simply continue to 
assume that individual moral agency is possible under authority structures when that is not the 
case. 
The question thus becomes: what are the implications of such social science research into 
crimes of obedience for individual accountability? This chapter will therefore investigate the 
following question: 
How do authority structures construct due obedience and what implications does 
it have for individual moral responsibility and holding individuals accountable 
for crimes of obedience? 
This chapter will proceed to first introduce the paradoxical concept of "crimes of obedience" 
and secondly discuss the construction of moral autonomy under authority structures and the 
dilemmas it poses for holding individuals accountable for their acts. The third part of this 
chapter will concern the obedience experiments by Stanley Milgram, first published in 1963. 
The fourth part of this chapter will focus on two relevant implications of the Milgram and 
other social science studies for the issue of accountability: I) the assumptions of moral 
autonomy under authority structures underlying the Nuremberg precedent and 2) the 
implications of holding individuals who act under authority structures accountable for gross 
human rights violations. The fifth and last part ofthis chapter will briefly discuss the 
Argentine Due Obedience Law as an alternative to the Nuremberg model which attempts to 











under authority structures. The Argentine soldiers operated under similar legal commissioning 
of crimes to that of the Nazi Germany soldiers and officials, but whereas Nuremberg expected 
those subordinates acting under superior orders in Nazi Germany to have rejected orders to 
commit gross human rights violations, the Argentine due obedience laws took cognisance of 
the inherent legal, moral and political restrictions of moral choice for subordinates who acted 
strictly on command. 
First, however, the following section will introduce the notion of crimes of obedience. 
3.2 Crimes of Obedience: Implications for the Nuremberg Precedent 
Kelman and Hamilton (1989:46) define a "crime of obedience" as "an act performed in 
response to orders from authority that is considered illegal or immoral by the larger 
community" (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:46). 
The Nuremberg IMT was particularly important for shaping new contemporary socio-
psychological approaches to the modem organisation of large-scale authorised crime. 
Significantly, it called attention to the fact that the Holocaust was not the result of exceptional 
or monstrous depravity but had depended on routine obedience by millions of people (Mixon, 
1989:7). Hence, whereas the world had expected to find "evil" characters and an immense 
racial hatred behind the works of the individuals who had carried out the tasks required for the 
genocide, the post-war trials revealed that the majority of workers in the Nazi regime had 
been ordinary people diligently and conscientiously "doing their jobs.,,19 
Socio-psychology research attempting to explain the acts of obedience which contributed to 
the Holocaust has found that the socio-psychological effect of authority structures is to 
construct due obedience in such a way that individuals act under the impression that they are 
19 The image of the obedient Nazi servant with no bad conscience was epitomised in Hanna Arendt's analysis of 
the "banality of evil" in the case of one of the major post-war trials of Adolf Eichmann in Israel: "The trouble 
with Eichmann was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, 
that they were. and still are, terribly and terrifYing normal. From the viewpoint afoul' legal institutions and oj' 
our mora/judgement, this normality was much more terri£ving than all the atrocities put together, for it implied 
(. . .) that this new criminal (. .. ) commits his crimes under circumstances that make it well-nigh impossible for 











not responsible for acts which they are ordered to perform (Mixon, 1989: 19; Miller, 1986: 180 
- 181; Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:137; Silver and Sabini, 1982:53). 
The problem with Nuremberg's ruling on crime of obedience is that it held subordinates who 
acted under orders accountable with the belief that (any) individuals should know the 
"illegality" of such orders, whereas socio-psychology studies (as will be discussed below) 
have demonstrated that, under a perceived legitimate authority setting, it is by no means made 
clear how individuals acting as subordinates could know this (Kelman and Hamilton, 
1989:46). 
Thus the central dilemma which the mass organisation of "legal crime" poses to holding 
individuals accountable for gross human rights violations is that authority structures 
(involving command superiority) effectively construct the individual responsibility of the 
actor of an order as acting out the will of another and that this person thus carries no moral 
re5ponsibility for it (Mixon, 1989: 10). This idea fundamentally contradicts the very 
assumption of moral autonomy upon which modem moral and legal notions of holding 
individuals accountable depend. 
This new understanding has put the previous assumptions of the moral autonomy of 
individuals acting under authority structures in a new light. Hence, with regards to these 
findings, the question for post-conflict societies attempting to hold perpetrators accountable 
for gross human rights violations is to what extent individuals who carried out orders under 
such authority structures can or should be held accountable2o. In order to adopt this 
knowledge into legal frameworks of adjudicating liability it is necessary to have a better 
understanding of how moral autonomy in authority structures is constructed. 
3.3 The Construction of Moral Autonomy in Authority Structures 
Legal structures and the hierarchical function of authorisation by rank in the modem 
administration of mass violence serve to create a legitimate setting in which subordinates may 
have every reason to regard their orders as legitimate and thus morally justified (Kelman and 
20 This dilemma coincides with the Nuremberg tribunal's own statement that in cases where moral choice had 











Hamilton, 1989:47). Precisely because "crimes of obedience" are committed when there is an 
inherent ambiguity in the authoritarian construction of the legality of immoral acts, a proper 
distinction between "an act of obedience" and "a crime of obedience" can only be made by 
claiming that the actor should have known that the order was immoral or illegal (Kelman and 
Hamilton, 1989:47). Hence, the notion of "liability responsibility" as discussed in Chapter 
One fundamentally works on the presumption that individuals are subjects or members of a 
particular legal order or moral community and implicitly expected to know the social or legal 
rules. Individuals are thus held accountable in their capacity as moral agents in relation to the 
rules of a particular legal territory or the norms in a particular community by sharing its 
common (social) space, even when they do not in effect have knowledge that certain acts are 
illegal. 
However, there exists a moral grey zone in those cases where an individual is faced with a 
situation in which he or she feels that there is no other alternative or that he or she is obligated 
to follow orders. These are instances in which an individual is faced with a moral dilemma; he 
or she has, on the one hand, an obligation to the perceived immediate legitimate authority and 
on the other a liability as a member of the wider moral community (or subject of a higher 
authority, such as God) outside the authority structure in which the individual is situated 
(Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:48). 
It is precisely in this moral dilemma that the immediate authority structure plays a crucial part 
in limiting the individual's autonomy as a moral agent by defining the relationship between 
the superior as someone who gives certain orders to subordinates and the subordinate as 
someone who acts on those commands (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:55). Thus, authority 
structures create the impression (or reality, through physical force) that, in so far as the 
subordinate is accountable for his or her own acts to his or her superior, he or she carries no 
moral responsibility for them. This is in essence part of the definition of a "legitimate 
authority," or the right (and the power) of an authority within a certain social structure to 
exercise authority over others (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:55). However, Kelman and 
Hamilton argue (1989:56) that legitimacy fundamentally depends upon the members' 
acceptance of it as such within the social setting or structure in which it occurs. Thus, so long 
as the members of this social setting accept the legitimacy of certain orders, this perceived 











fundamental requirement of disobedience to authorities is a countervailing set of norms which 
do not accept this legitimacy (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:57). 
However, despite the religious and historical availability of normative support for 
disobedience to gross human rights violations (e.g. the Christian faith and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948), it is by no means clear that disobedience is 
psychologically available to those most in need of it: actors in crimes of obedience and those 
who stand in judgement over them. I.e. the theoretical and moral availability of the right to 
say no to such crimes under due obedience is meaningless if the right is not perceived or 
appropriately translated into judgements under pressure (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:76). 
The most controversial and famous obedience studies were conducted by the American Yale 
professor, Stanley Milgram, who observed 1000 individual subjects from 1960 to 1963 
(Miller, 1986:2). Originally designed to discover the effects of a situation (environment) 
involving a perceived authority on obedience, Milgram found instead that the majority (65 
percent) of "everyday people" involved as subjects in his experiment responded with faithful 
obedience to the instructor (Milgram) in the experiment to execute electric shocks on another 
individuae l (Mixon, 1989:3). 
3.4 The Milgram Experiments and "the Agentic State" 
Milgram viewed the experimenter (the instructor) as representing a legitimate authority, one 
who "is perceived to be in a position of social control within a given situation" (Milgram, 
1974: 142 - 143 in Blass, 2000:39). What Milgram found, in his own words, was that "there is 
a propensity for people to accept definitions of action provided by legitimate authority. That 
is, although the subject performs the action, he allows authority to define its meaning" 
21 The controversy surrounding the Milgram experiment was due to its research ethics and the deception 
involved in the methodology of testing how far people will go when ordered to impose harm (electric shocks) 
upon another person (although the shocks were faked and the individual they were instructed to shock was not 
harmed) (Miller. 1989:4). Nevertheless, the importance of the Milgram experiments was that the results 
confirmed that individuals in a perceived legitimate authority setting do not feel responsible for actions which 
they are ordered to perform by a higher authority and thereby do not perceive themselves as morally rcsponsible 
for their own acts ordered by an authority. Milgram's controversial obedience experiments and his unexpected 
findings led to considerable further investigations and discussions. On the one hand, other social scientists set 
out to test Milgram's experimental findings in various ways; on the other hand, there has been intense discussion 
of the correct interpretation and the precise implications of his findings on crimes of obedience and the 











(Milgram, 1974: 145 in Blass, 2000:39). Milgram found, moreover, that under such perceived 
authority, a fundamental shift takes place in the individual from a state of moral autonomy to 
what Milgram named "the agentic state,,22, in which individuals under a perceived legitimate 
authority relinquish responsibility to the authority and therefore follow his or her orders 
without taking into account the morality of the order (Blass, 2000:39). What happens, 
according to Milgram, is that the individual feels responsible to the authority directing him or 
her but no responsibilityfor the content of the actions that the authority prescribes (Blass, 
2000:39). 
Briefly stated, Milgram's obedience experiment was situated in a university laboratory setting 
and, with the experimenter by their side, voluntary subjects were told that the purpose of the 
experiment was to examine the effects of punishment on learning (Miller, 1989:5). The 
subjects were innocently put into a role-playas "the teacher" in a fixed draw with "the 
learner" being played by an actor. In an adjacent room, the learner was strapped to a chair 
with electrodes attached to his arms. The teacher was instructed to read the first word of a 
word pair together with associated words, and the task for the learner was to connect the 
correct word pairs (Miller, 1986:5). In front of the teacher was a shock generator with a panel 
consisting of30 switches, each corresponding to voltage ranging from 15 to 450 volts. Verbal 
labels on the last switches indicated "intense shock," "extreme intensity shock," and "danger: 
severe shock" and the last two levers were marked "XXX" (Miller, 1986:7). Every time the 
learner answered incorrectly or gave an invalid response communicated through a phone, the 
teacher was instructed to administer electronic shocks with increasing intensity (Miller, 
1986:5). The teacher was informed that, "although the shocks can be extremely painful, they 
22 Milgram eventually explained "the agentic state" in terms of a genetically based "fatal flaw nature has 
designed unto us" (Milgram, 1974: 188 in Mixon, 1989:3). According to Milgram, the agentic state is 
biologically based and due to a human inadcquacy of thinking and acting autonomously when this reality is 
challenged by outer authority structures (Mixon, 1989:3). The ultimate consequence of this state is that the 
individual enters a state of mind which prevents him or her from acting autonomously and thus relinquish their 
perception of own responsibility of their actions (Mixon, 1989:9; Blass. 2000:39). Milgram's determinist 
perspective is one of the controversial aspects of his experiments. Thus, a major contrasting view among socio-
psychologists to Milgram's theory is that individuals do not relinquish their own moral consciousness under an 
"agcntic state" of mind but are made to believe that they are acting morally correct according to the response 
which the situation calls for. This point of view argues that, by understanding how learned morals and 
authoritative situations affect the human psyche, human consciousness can be brought to awareness of the 
countervailing set of norms that permit and justify disobedience (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989:63; Sabini and 











cause no permanent tissue damage to the learner" (Miller, 1989:7). In moments when the 
subjects were hesitant about administering shocks or would tum to the experimenter, the 
experimenter as authority figure in charge of the experimental setting would respond with a 
standard set of one to four increasingly strident prods to encourage, pressure and finally 
demand that the teacher should go on (Miller, 1986:7). If the teacher continued to shock the 
learner up to 300 volts, the learner would pound on the wall, scream and refuse to continue 
the experiment. After this point the leamer's responses would no longer appear on the 
indicator light. 
Failure to respond was considered a faulty answer, and the teacher was still instructed to press 
the level (Miller, 1986:8). Thereby the psychological dilemma explained above was simulated 
in that the subject involved would face two simultaneously felt obligations: one to obey and 
satisfy the experimenter's (i.e the authority figure's) expectations of the requirements needed 
for the fulfilment of his experiment, and the other the subject's own wish or moral tension 
about not harming "the learner" (Miller, 1986: 15). 
The result of the experiments was that 65 % of the total 40 subj ects tested during 1960 - 1963 
administered the shocks to the last voltage (Miller, 1986:9). Milgram tested in all 1000 
subjects up until 1965 in similar simulated situations, but the initial 65 % result of obedience 
remained unchallenged (Miller, 1986:9). 
In his book, Obedience to Authority, Milgram related the moral conflict of his experiments as 
intimately linked to the dilemmas faced by subordinates acting as soldiers or bureaucrats in 
mass killings or genocides such as the Vietnam War and the Holocaust (Miller, 1986: 181 -
182). The basic dilemma, argues Milgram, can be captured in the situation where an 
individual is told by a legitimate authority to act against a third individual (Milgram, 
1974: 177, quoted in Miller, 1986: 181). The Milgram studies thus presented a plausible 
explanation of how human behaviour could be swayed during the Holocaust to violate the 
most fundamental of fellow human being's needs without questioning the legitimacy or the 
objectives of their actions (Miller, 1986: 179). For instance, Milgram related the subjects in his 
experiment to the people who carried out Hitler's commands, both being willing to allocate 
responsibility to something "higher" in command. Whereas "science" was the justification for 
his experiments, a "hygienic process against Jewish vermin" was the rationale of the 











process of destructive obedience, which evidently also played a role in the obedience 
experiments. He compared the fact that in Nazi Germany it was considered an act of 
discourtesy to talk about the killings (especially among those most intimately involved in 
them) with subjects in the experiment exhibiting embarrassment or discomfort when objecting 
to what they were told to do (Milgram, 1974: 187 in Miller, 1986: 182). 
Sabini and Silver (1982:46) have also found in their studies of obedience that individuals 
normally feel inhibited to initiate moral reproach in a situation in which they are passers by 
(witnesses) to "something wrong" happening (e.g. a mother beating up her child). In these 
situations, Sabini and Silver argue, individuals are hesitant to act because 1) intervention may 
imply reproach and 2) action to intervene forces attention on the person who intervenes and 
the reason for intervening (hence, a questioning of his or her authority to intervene), which 
calls upon the socially accepted moral interpretation of what or who is justified in the 
situation (since legitimate authority as discussed above fundamentally depends on a general 
consent by those which it concerns) (Sabini and Silver, 1982:47). What in effect is happening 
is that an individual faced with a moral dilemma will look for the "objective" and thus 
"correct" way of acting according to the "general interpretation" (i.e. norms) of people in that 
situation or moral community. Ironically, therefore, the socio-psychology research studies 
show that, as moral agents, individuals are intimately aware of being accountable according to 
the prevailing norms (Le. legitimate authority) of the society in which they live, even to the 
extent that they do not question that authority in the face of their intuitive resistance to 
denigrating treatment of fellow human beings, unless they have an explicit or implicit 
authority relationship with them in which they can act as the authority (Sabini and Silver, 
1982:38 - 40). 
These and other similarities showed that what Milgram called "the agentic state" correlates 
with what the social sciences know about individuals committing gross human rights 
violations under legitimate due obedience, which is what Nuremberg rejected as a legitimate 











3.5 Implications of Milgram's Obedience Experiments: 
Obedience as a Learned Moral Norm 
Socio-psychology academics such as Kelman and Hamilton (1989: 136), Sabini and Silver, 
1982:66, Mixon, (1989:3 and 11) and Blass (2000:53), argue that obedience is a learned 
reaction deeply rooted in hierarchical authority structures, which denies individual thinking 
and obscures individual responsibility for acts under orders. Perceived legitimate authority 
and scientific expertise are significant factors which, in a situation of "illegal" or "immoral" 
commands by authority figures, create the illusion that individuals owe their actions to others 
and have no choice but to comply with the commanding authority's orders (Blass, 2000:53). 
This powerful perception leads to the individual not seeing him- or herself as responsible for 
the acts that he or she performs in response to orders (Blass, 2000:53). 
The implication of this is that a distinct difference develops between the subjectively 
perceived morality of the situation and the objective morality of the situation. This distinction 
may be compared to that made in the initial analysis in Chapter One between being 
responsible and (others) holding someone responsibli3. I.e. it could be argued that the 
subjective perception (or not) of being responsible should not be confused with the objective 
morality of the situation. In other words, an agent can be morally responsible for his or her 
actions even if he or she does not perceive him- or herself as responsible. However, in the 
case of holding someone responsible, the position may be different. Due to the relational 
nature of holding someone responsible, an individual's responsibility in relation to an 
authority (e.g. law or commander) is defined according to that authority's rules and/or 
obligations. However, this position is more complicated as it may involve not only implicit 
obligations and duties but also the role of other parties, especially of the authority figures 
involved, which may also be morally relevant. In effect, therefore, in so far as an individual 
judges a situation primarily from the perception of the obligation he or she mayor may not 
have in relation to an authority, it does not interfere with the objective responsibility which he 
or she may be held accountable according to by e.g. international humanitarian law. 
For instance, Milgram's subjects perceived their duty in the experiment as owing their actions 
to the experimenter (as they had voluntarily consented to take part in the experiment with the 











explicit understanding that they were merely assistants in an experiment concerning the effect 
of punishment on learning). With respect to the subjects' intuitive interpretation of their role 
as being accountable to the experimenter, they perceived their own moral autonomy as limited 
to fulfilling the task they were set (by the experimenter) to do. The result was that their 
subjectively perceived autonomy was limited to their relationship to the experimenter (i.e. 
"the experimenter is in charge, my role is to do as I am told and not question his 
instructions"), whereas their objective responsibility as moral agents for their own acts 
irrespective of their relationship to the experimenter was, strictly speaking, not altered (i.e. 
"the experimenter instructs me to push the level, but if I do that I may seriously harm another 
person and I will be responsible for the consequences"). 
Another psychological effect of moral autonomy under authority structures demonstrated in 
Milgram's experiments and subsequent socio-psychology experiments concerns the ways in 
which an individual gradually gets involved in responding to commands, so that in a sense an 
individual can get psychologically or emotionally "entrapped" by his or her initial behaviour 
to obey or perform further commands. Routine behaviour under authority structures is 
typically characterised by the logic of entrapment; the effect of failing to object to orders to 
commit inhuman or accept denigrating treatment of others results in "moral drift" in the 
individual (altering of the individual's own morality to accept harming others) because the 
moral precept ofthe situation remains unclear when it is not challenged (Sabini and Silver, 
1982:49). 
In order to understand why individuals respond with obedience to orders although it may be 
contrary to their own wants or desires, one needs to understand, Sabini and Silver (1982:61) 
argue, why individuals who commit crimes of obedience do not feel or perceive themselves as 
personally and morally responsible for their behaviour. "Morality" is generally perceived by 
individuals as an objective phenomenon that exists beyond the individual's wants, interests 
and control (for instance that of the moral community which the individual resides) (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1967 in Sabini and Silver, 1982:68). Most individuals faced with a moral 
dilemma in a particular situation therefore tend to consider which moral principles govern that 
particular situation (by asking "what should I do?") before his or her own desires (by asking 
what do I want to do?). Therefore, by responding positively to commands, individuals believe 
that they are responding correctly by negating their personal inclinations in favour of doing 











moral philosophy by Kant24 between subjective inclinations and moral duties (Kant, 1956:66). 
As with the traditional Christian conception of "temptations" which have to be resisted in 
order to do what is morally right according to God's law, the Kantian conception of morality 
in practice opposes one's subjective inclinations to one's objective moral duties. Kant argues 
that individuals have a moral duty to do what is right for the common good, which treats 
every individual as an end in him- or herself, and that this essentially necessitates a practical 
and rational constriction of ones own inclinations (Kant, 1956:64). 
Ironically and paradoxically, in cases of crimes of obedience this may result in a reversal in 
which agents come to see the moral thing to do as involving an override of their subjective 
inclinations to act in human solidarity with their victims and invest the "illegal" and 
"immoral" orders of authority figures with the status of objective duties. Sabini and Silver 
(1982:45) refer to this eonflict as "preference versus principle": "[t]hat actors treat judgments 
of the moral character of an act as objective makes it possible to doubt that the assessment 
they have reached is correct. The doubt, we have argued, can lead to the inhibition of the 
expression of ones position" (Sabini and Silver, 1982:46). 
The implicit consequence of failing to object or make a moral reproach is that the individual 
who witnesses the violation taking place is him- or herself (implicitly) consenting to the 
(immoral) action (Sabini and Silver, 1982:49 51). Zimbardo's famous simulated prison 
experiment to study prison dynamics using American high school students as "guards" and 
"prisoners" in 1973 showed that when immoral behaviour is not sanctioned it is also allowed 
to escalate. The experiment which was to go on for two weeks had to be ended after only six 
days due to the emotionally charged, antagonistic and brutal way in which some guards 
started treating the prisoners which was not challenged by the other guards (Sabini and Silver, 
1982:51 ). 
Sabini and Silver (1982:62) argue that the way responsibility is construed in hierarchical 
structures such as bureaucracies thus confuse technical responsibility with moral (or legal) 
responsibility. Whereas "technical responsibility" is internally decided within the 
organisation's confines of rank, the "moral responsibility" of an act goes beyond the rank-
and role definitions of individuals in an organisation and remains with the responsible 
l-l Kant's moral philosophy was briefly introduced in Chapter One under section "1.2 The Religious and 











individual. In other words, while subordinates are reassured that the responsibility for their 
actions are in the hands of their superiors, this is mistakenly based on technical, internal and 
organisational responsibility (Sabini and Silver, 1982:63). This distinction correlates with the 
previous distinction made in Chapter One between the internal and external notions of 
accountabilit/5• An internal notion of accountability relates to the strictly defined 
organisational responsibility which an individual has in terms of his or her position, role or 
duty, which is constricted and defined along the organisation's own divisions of 
responsibility. An external notion of accountability relates to the responsibility which is not 
defined by the organisation but by those who answer for the actions taken by the organisation. 
Thus, when moral responsibility is attributed to the individual for his or her own actions, he or 
she will externally (i.e. morally) remain accountable and/or responsible even though internally 
and technically his or her responsibility and/or accountability may be defined according to 
limited role responsibilities which may not incur moral or legal responsibility. 
A crucial mistake is thus made when lack of accountability is excused under the premise that 
an order is legitimate or issued by a legitimate authority. Ifwe consider the subjects in 
Milgram's experiment, it is clear that the majority viewed their responsibility as limited to 
their internal accountability relationship to the experimenter as legitimate, and that the 
experimenter was holding the external accountability for the consequences of the experiment, 
i.e. the morality (and legal consequences) of the actions of the subjects under instructions. The 
crucial mistake these subjects made was that they viewed their objective autonomy (and thus 
responsibility) as a moral agent as subject (and thus limited) to the presumed legitimate 
authority of the experimenter. 
Hence, in authoritative role relationships, there is an implicit misunderstanding that the 
authority carries the responsibility for what he or she has ordered (Kelman and Hamilton, 
1982:59). Thus, ifthe premise for holding someone accountable is based on the assumption 
that he or she knew that either the order or the authority who issued to order was illegitimate 
or morally wrong, the crucial consequence of holding individuals accountable under such 
circumstances is that the premise upon which holding those individuals accountable is false. 











However the right with which an authority may issue an order and be conceived of as 
"justified" cmcially depends on the acceptance of the members in the social context in which 
the authority exist (Kelman and Hamilton, 1982:60). The right to give an order thus depends 
on whether the members of the social context in which it takes place perceive it as legitimate. 
E.g. if the German bureaucrats implementing the HoIcaust conceived Hitler, the Nazi regime 
and their institutional superiors as legitimate, what are the consequences for their own 
accountability? 
The Argentine due obedience framework for prosecuting some of those responsible in the 
previous military dictatorship for gross human rights violations presents one possible option 
for taking into account the limitations of moral autonomy under authority stmctures in a legal 
framework of accountability. 
3.6 The Argentinean Due Obedience Law: 
A Legal Framework of Accountability for Moral Obedience under Authority 
First, a brief account of the historical context is needed in order to understand the 
circumstances in which a practical intervention to determine the degrees of involvement in 
crimes in the Argentine case was called for. 
The military dictatorship that mled Argentina from 1976 to 1983 was institutional in that it 
involved the armed forces as a whole. Its inspiration was ideological and responded to a threat 
(left-wing ideology) to its power by not only destroying the combat ability of the enemy but 
also its militants26 (Zalaquett, 1995:21). 
By the end of 1982, the military dictatorship had become completely discredited due to the 
loss of the Malvinas (Falklands Islands) War, the denunciations of acts of cormption and 
horrendous detailed stories of human denigration in the local newspapers (Nino, 1995:420). 
Raul Alfonsin was voted President and promised to investigate the human rights violations 
during the "dirty war" and bring to trial not only the military leaders who presumably gave 
26 The character of the repression that followed under the Argentine military juntas included concerted, secret 
military actions which resulted in thousands of "disappearances," massive use of detention without trial, torture 











orders to abduct, torture and kill subversives and the officers who committed the worst 
excesses but also guerrilla leaders (Nino, 1995:420). However, it was politically impossible 
for the new government to impose a short time period for the trials due to the strong public 
pressure for retributive justice (Nino, 1995 :421) 27. 
The final attempt by Alfonsin was a proposed due obedience law in 1987 which clearly 
defined the limits of accountability for military ranks which did not hold decision-making 
capacities. Although the Alfonsin government was forced to resign due to the economic crisis 
and terrorist attack two years later, the due obedience law received wide support among the 
majority of the military (Nino, 1995:426 - 427). 
The Argentine Due Obedience Law established that, without proof to the contrary, those who 
at the time of perpetration had the rank of chief officers, subordinate officers, officials and 
soldiers of the amled, security, police and prison forces were exempt from prosecution by 
virtue of having followed orders. These subordinates were deemed to have acted under duress, 
in subordination to superior authority without the possibility of resisting or refusing to follow 
those orders and examining their lawfulness28 (Argentine Due Obedience Law of June 4th 
1987 in Kritz, 1995:507). 
27 One of the legal dilemmas in the preparations for prosecution was the military code's establishment of a 
defence of due obedience. Although this military code was useful in limiting the scope of military officials to be 
tried, it also had the undesirable effect ofletting otT many middle-ranking officcrs who complied with orders to 
commit gross human rights violations (Nino, 1995:423). The legal precedent of interpreting due obedience 
presupposed the excuse of mistake as to the legitimacy of the order given. This gave Alfonsin the gap to create a 
bill that would interpret the code oflaw on obedience in such a way that it would strike a balance between an 
outrageous literal interpretation and an excessively harsh interpretation (Nino, 1995:423 - 424). However, the 
draft bill was substantially altered by Congress before its enactment, which exposed a much larger group of 
soldiers to prosecution. The consequence was years of delays, which produced more unrest and fear in the 
military and eventually provoked a radical and real threat offurther violence and unrest in 1987 (Nino, 
1995:425). This serious threat to the new democratic government is known as the "Eastcr Uprising" as it took 
place in the Easter week of 1987. The military launched "Operation Dignity" in order to preserve the armed 
forces against the radical government and accomplice generals. The operation included a military garrison, 
supported by some of the military fundamentalists known as "the painted faces." Alfonsin went by helicopter to 
thc garrison and succeeded in obtaining the surrender of the rebels. However, despite the "happy ending," the 
new government soon realized that the Supreme Court refused to define the limits of due obedience, thus 
effectively suspended the trials of the rebels, which eventually gave way to increased pressure from the military 
(Nino, 1995:425 - 426). 
2gThe Supreme Court of Argentina, Buenos Aires upheld the constitutionality of the law and confirmcd that the 
law only applied to service-connected acts (i.e. requiring the specific activities of military authority and related 
to the specific functions of the anned forces) and when the order is not patently illegal, is given by a superior 
officer within the sphere of authority (service-connected) and points to the execution of an act which is also 
within the sphere of competence of the subordinate officer (Argentina: Supreme Court Decision on the Due 











Alfonsfn identified three categories of perpetrators of the previous military dictatorship: I) 
those who had planned the repression and given the accompanying orders; 2) those who had 
acted beyond the scope oftheir orders; and 3) those who strictly complied with their orders 
(Alfonsfn, 1993:15; Nino, 1996:63). Alfonsfn believed that, whereas the first two categories 
deserved punishment, the third group should be given the opportunity to reincorporate 
themselves into the new democracy (Nino, 1996:63). The first category was distinguished by 
virtue of its constituents' capacity to make decisions according to rank and command 
structures. The second and third groups were distinguished by examining the due obedience-
defence in military law (Nino, 1996:64). 
Although the Alfonsin government acknowledged that due obedience is not a viable excuse 
for gross human rights violations, it upheld the position that an exception should be made in 
the particular historical context ofthe "dirty war." Two reasons were given for this choice. 
First, the atrocities during the dirty war had been committed "within a climate of compulsion 
and amid an intense propaganda campaign that aimed to legitimise violence" (Nino, 1996:64). 
Second, an important reason for limiting punishment to those who acted in excess of their 
orders was that it supported the idea that those who followed orders were given a chance to 
cooperate in the democratic polity, which was in line with an overall general policy that 
emphasised punishment not as a retributive but as a means to protect the future social order 
(Nino, 1996:64). 
The distinctions of accountability introduced in the Argentine due obedience framework 
present a possible answer to the dilemmas posed by due obedience in hierarchical 
organisations. By excusing those officials without discretionary authority who had strictly 
followed the rules and the orders of the day, the Argentine due obedience law takes into 
account the crucial context of the (perceived) legitimate social environment in which 
subordinates act under authority. Without justifying or accepting the right of such authorities, 
the Argentine due obedience law acknowledges the strict compliance required by military 
service and that soldiers who ostensibly or expressly refused orders to obey service-connected 
orders without a justified reason would be punished (Argentina: Supreme Court Decision on 
the Due Obedience Law of June 2nd 1987 in Kritz, 1995 :510). 
The Argentine attempt to construct a legal framework of accountability for moral obedience 











construction of individual autonomy under authority structures. It acknowledged the 
obstruction of the individual's perception of own moral autonomy under authority structures, 
which, furthermore, mayor may not be physical or legal (i.e. physical force/punishment 
and/or prosecution for not obeying orders). It also acknowledged that individuals under such 
circumstances act morally, politically and legally "correct" according to the norms and laws 
of the society at the time and that they therefore cannot be expected to have known the 
illegality of their acts. Moreover, individuals acting under obedience tend to have a subjective 
view that their acts are legitimate and therefore that they are not accountable for them (since 
the authority under which they are acting has effectively limited their experience of 
themselves as morally autonomous agents). 
The implication for accountability of the Argentine Due Obedience Law was that it managed 
to target those most responsible under such circumstances, i.e. those who acted in excess of 
their expressly ordered commands and those who held a position which allowed for 
discretionary authority (i.e. decision-making), or who clearly knew the orders to commit 
certain atrocities to be illegal. This framework for holding individuals who act under strict 
authority structures accountable is thus, when compared to the Nuremberg model, more 
realistic with respect to the problems posed by due obedience. 
The Argentine experience ofthe real, physical threat of a military coup and political backlash 
also illustrate the need for political compromise between the old regime and the new in order 
to ensure a peaceful social transformation in transitional states. Whereas the Nuremberg 
model requires prosecution and punishment exclusively as means to accountability, recent 
transitional justice practices have developed other non-retributive means of accountability, i.e. 
conditional amnesty accompanied by a truth process. 
The following chapter will raise the question whether punishment as a means to 
accountability could be achieved via other (non-punitive) means. This will require an analysis 
of the dominant positions on transitional justice according to the basic criteria for holding 












Transitional Justice and Conditional Amnesty as Non-retributive Means to Justice 
4.1 Amnesty and Transitional Justice 
This chapter will investigate the practical and political context in which amnesty has been 
used by transitional states in the last three decades as well as the debate in transitional justice 
and international relations literature concerning the objectives of dealing with past mass gross 
human rights violations in relation to the need for justice and human rights. 
The recent developments of conditional amnesty together with truth processes suggest that 
transitional states seek non-punitive means to accountability as a means to overcome the 
practical and political obstacles to prosecution and punishment However, it is not clear 
whether or in what sense conditional amnesty achieves a measure of accountability, or 
whether this is compatible with the accountability sought through prosecution and 
punishment. 
In order to answer this question, we need to clarify the criteria and objectives of 
accountability in general. Though this has not been directly addressed, there is a considerable 
body of work by scholars in the field of international law and transitional justice on how to 
reconcile the tensions between the international obligation to hold perpetrators accountable 
for gross violations of human rights and the possible need to accommodate peace and stability 
in transitional contexts29• There are three main positions in this discussion: 1) The Prosecution 
and Punishment Position, 2) The General Amnesty Position and 3) The Truth Process 
Accompanied by Amnesty Position. 
Against the background of this debate we may thus attempt to formulate a normative 
framework in the ethos of a liberal-democratic worldview which may serve as a basis for 
assessing the level and degree of accountability sought through the South African amnesty in 
Chapter Five. 
The main scholars in this debate are: Alex Borainc (2000); Andre du Toit (2000), Pricilla Hayner (2001); 
Carlos Nino (1996); Diane Orentlicher (1995); Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams (2001); Naomi Roht-Arriaza 










Thus the focus of this chapter will be threefold. First, it will clarify the practical, political and 
moral obstacles to prosecution and punishment in post-confliet transitional contexts. 
Secondly, it will distinguish between three different types of amnesty and analyse how the 
scope and criteria of amnesty compare to the basic criteria of holding individuals accountable. 
Thirdly and finally, this chapter will outline the main positions in the transitional justice and 
international law literature which address the accountability objectives for transitional states 
in the aftermath of mass gross human rights violations. This will provide a normative 
framework for accountability objectives for transitional states in which prosecution and 
punishment is not the only means of accountability, i.e. justice needs in transitional states. 
4.2 Amnesty and the Obstacles to Prosecution and Punishment 
"Amnesty" is a sovereign act of oblivion granted to perpetrators guilty of past offences (De 
Zayas, 1992: 148). Historically, amnesty is a relatively uncontroversiallegal mechanism by 
which an offender is granted exception from punishment for the offence of which he or she is 
guil ty30 (Slye, 2002:] 74). Amnesty has been used for various purposes throughout history and 
has often been employed both at the start of and during wars in order to recruit troops and at 
the end of wars in order to cultivate peace and reconciliation (Slye, 2002:174). E.g. amnesty 
clauses have been frequently found in peace treaties, such as the Westphalia Peace of 1648 
and the Treaty of Peace and Amity between Great Britain and France of] 814 after the 
Napoleonic wars, and signify the will of the parties to apply the principle of tabula rasa to 
past offences (De Zayas, 1992: 148 - 149). Thus, amnesty has played an important role in self-
determination as it expresses the will of a sovereign to distance itself from past atrocities. This 
is also expressed through the royal or "divine" pardon of crimes, which is the sole prerogative 
ofthe sovereign (De Zayas, 1992: 149). 
An amnesty forecloses punishment and thus retrospectively regards past crimes as void, 
which, in the case of a general amnesty, effectively annuls the crime. Conversely, a pardon 
30 There are important differences between different kinds of amnesty, which will be discussed in greater detail 
in the next section, e.g. the distinction between general amnesty (providing immunity for all wrongful acts), 
limited amnesty (providing immunity only for some, e.g. politically motivated offences) and conditional amnesty 
(limiting the number of offenders who are granted amnesty on condition that certain conditions are met) (De 











which spares a convicted offender from prosecution is prmpective by only annulling the 
sanction (punishment) and not the offensive action (Orentlicher, 1995 :410). Thus, some 
international law analysts argue that because amnesty annuls the offence it is more 
objectionable than a pardon, which only annuls the punishment of the offender after he or she 
is found guilty (Orentiicher, 1995:410). 
The idea of amnesty is the opposite of the notion of the just punishment of offenders (De 
Zayas, 1992: 148). However, there are three major obstacles to prosecution and punishment as 
a means of achieving individual accountability for gross human rights violations: 
I. Political constraints related to the need for peace and stability to ensure the transition 
to a new democratic regime. 
2. Practical constraints related to lack of legal and material resources required for 
prosecution of human rights violations. 
3. Moral choices related to the political will and moral choices societies make in 
choosing a form of redress of their violent past. 
4.2.1 Political Constraints 
The need for peaceful coexistence in post-conflict societies among divided perpetrator and 
victim/survivor populations creates a moral and political barrier to retributive processes due to 
the feared antagonistic effect prosecutions may have in a society already conflict-ridden and 
in which the divide between guilty and innocent is blurred (Morris, 1997:30; Van Zyl, 
2000:43; Zalaquett, 1995:4). 
In a transition to a new regime there is often a need to share political power with the previous 
responsible perpetrators, military or governors who are still in positions of relative power and 
are needed to ensure a stable transition but who also were responsible for ordering and/or 
carrying out mass human rights violations under the previous regime. This makes prosecution 
an unviable option (Morris, 1997:30; Nino, 1995:418). 
Argentina and South Africa are two examples of this dilemma. In the Argentine transition the 











human rights violations committed under the fonner military regime3 ] (Morris, 1997:30). In 
South Africa threats from the fonner military to withdraw its support during the negotiated 
settlement placed considerable constraints on the prospects for possible prosecutions of 
perpetrators (Morris, 1997:30). 
4.2.2 Practical Constraints 
A second obstacle is the practical and legal resources required to implement the prosecutorial 
process ofa large number of perpetrators (Morris, 1997:30). In the context oflarge scale 
atrocities of human rights, not only are a large number of perpetrators involved but there is 
also many degrees of involvement of direct and indirect contributors of actual events and 
actions. Prosecuting every individual involved poses not only practical difficulties but also 
requires extensive financial, physical and human resources, which are scarce in war-tom or 
exhausted post-conflict societies (Morris, 1997:30). The genocides in Rwanda and the fonner 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s illustrate the economical and practical impossibility of trying 
tens to hundreds of thousands of cases of vast numbers of gross human rights violations 
(Rosenberg, 1999:352). 
Besides the political risk of a revolt that may overturn the efforts to call perpetrators to 
account for their past deeds, post-conflict societies seldom have a functioning judiciary 
equipped to prosecute human rights abuses (Young, 2002:433). A strong argument against an 
absolute obligation on states to prosecute perpetrators of human rights violations is, therefore, 
that prosecution may undercut the very efforts to establish a justice system needed to uphold 
and protect human rights in the future (Slye, 2002:184; Nino, 1995:418). 
4.2.3 Moral Choices 
Transitional states are often faced with serious moral dilemmas, which require them to make 
crucial choices. Thus, accountability measures are conditioned by national will and priorities 
(Morris, 1997:30). While, in tenns of the Nuremberg precedent, international law makes it 











clear that states do have an international duty to prosecute breaches of human rights, national 
prosecution is subject to the initiative of the sovereign to take the necessary steps to recognise 
that such breaches took place and to take steps to investigate, adjudicate and eventually 
prosecute the perpetrators (Young, 2002:434). 
The means by which states seek accountability are also conditioned by the values the society 
wishes to emphasise. E.g. in the ease of the Spanish transition from the dictatorship of 
General Franco for instance, amnesia (forgetting) and amnesty (forgiving) were valued above 
holding the perpetrators of the past violations accountable (Aguilar, 200 I :98)33. In South 
Africa, reconciliation and restorative justice were valued above a purely retributive objective 
of dealing with the past (Hayner, 200 1:39). 
In order to answer the question whether conditional amnesty may be compatible with the 
objectives of transitional justice, it is also necessary to distinguish between different types of 
amnesty. 
4. 3 Three Types of Amnesty 
Three main types of amnesties can be distinguished according to the degree and level of 
accountability achieved34 : 
1. General Amnesty and Blanket Amnesty 
2. Conditional Amnesty and Partial Amnesty 
3. Accountable Amnesty 
33 Also see Andrew Rigby's treatment of the Spanish transition in "Amnesty and Amnesia in Spain" pp. 73 79 
in Peace Review: A Transnational Quarterly, Volume 12, No.1, March 2000. 











4.3,1 General Amnesty and Blanket Amnesty 
General and blanket amnesties are characteristic of the kind of amnesty granted in Latin 
American countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the primary example is the Chilean 
amnesty passed in 1978 (Slye, 2002:249; Young, 2002:441). 
A common feature of general and blanket amnesties is that they are concealed and anonymous 
and typically self-appointed by a regime that has been involved in long-standing human rights 
abuse (Slye, 2002:240). Thus, the purpose is to ensure that prosecutions are barred once the 
regime has relinquished its power (Young, 2002:442). These kinds of amnesty are also 
typically applied in a widespread manner, that is, they contain no procedural requirements and 
apply to the beneficiaries through a group characteristic, as opposed to identifYing 
individuals, and indiscriminately cover a vast array of different kinds of crime over a long 
period of time, regardless of the beneficiaries' motives or objectives in committing the crimes 
(Young, 2002:442; Burke-White, 2001:482; Slye, 2002:241). 
Characteristic of general and blanket amnesties is also that they involve an indemnification, 
which in effect annuls the crimes as well as absolves the perpetrators from punishment. They 
preclude the further criminal as well as civil liability of the recipients and provide little or no 
information concerning the past abuses (Slye, 2002:241). Such amnesties may help diminish 
or end a violent conflict (thus, they may be the result of a political compromise ending violent 
conflict), but they are not seen as a genuine expression of a will to come to terms with the past 
as they do not depend on democratic consent or include any official initiative to establish 
investigations about the past crimes or provide any relief to the victims (Slye, 2002 :241). 
In so far as general or blanket amnesties discard any accountability process there is therefore 
no sense in which these amnesties could be compatible with accountability (Young, 2002:443; 
Slye, 2002:24035 ; Burke-White, 2001 :482). 











4.3.2 Conditional Amnesty and Partial Amnesty 
Unlike blanket or self-amnesties, compromise amnesties are restricted (that is, made 
conditional upon fulfilment of certain requirements or partial, i.e. only covering certain 
crimes). Conditional and partial amnesties can also be the result of a political compromise 
(Slye, 2002:241). 
Conditional and partial amnesties are thus qualified in relation to their restrictions as to the 
acts (e.g. exhibiting a particular motive) that they cover and/or to the categories or groups of 
people to which they apply (Slye, 2002:242). Such qualifications usually have the benefit of 
providing some knowledge of past crimes and some acknowledgement of their existence, for 
instance through an officially appointed investigatory truth commission, though the 
investigations are usually general and not focused on individual incidents or individual 
perpetrators and victims (Slye, 2002:241). 
Conditional and partial amnesties may not be immune to civil suits and the prosecution of 
those found responsible for acts not covered by the amnesty (Stye, 2002:242). Victims may, 
therefore, legitimately object to amnesties in such cases and pursue and seek prosecution or 
some fonn of minimal relief (Slye, 2002:242). 
Since this type of amnesty provides and accompanies official initiatives to remedy the 
consequences in the fonn of investigatory process and is limited in scope, it achieves some 
remedy to victims and, in the case of partial amnesty, is discriminating about holding some 
perpetrators accountable for the past crimes (Slye, 2002:242 - 243). An example of this is the 
Argentine amnesty in 1985, which only sought to prosecute the highest strata of military 
leaders of the previous military dictatorship through the Due Obedience Law, which was 
passed in order to excuse the obedience to orders by lower-grade soldiers36 (Burke-White, 
2001 :493). 
36 See Chapter Three section "3.5 The Argentine Due Obedience Law: A Legal Framework of Accountability for 











4.3.3 Accountable Amnesty 
Accountable amnesty is the most narrowly defined conditional amnesty. While bearing 
similar characteristics of conditional amnesties, accountable amnesty is a type of amnesty that 
achieves some level and form of accountability by imposing a form of public disclosure on 
the recipients concerning their past crimes. Accountable amnesties are limited in scope with 
respect to both the crimes that they cover and the recipients to which they apply (Slye, 
2002:245). Recipients thus qualify for amnesty through individual applications for non-
personal crimes subject to the scrutiny and adjudication of a quasi-legal committee in a public 
procedure. The identity of the perpetrators and details concerning their offences therefore 
become known. Amnesty for disclosed crimes is also limited so that the applicant may be 
subject to public and/or civil prosecution in the case that their application is declined (Burke-
White, 2001 :486). 
This type of amnesty therefore provides more than minimal relief to victims (Slye, 2002 :245). 
Accountable amnesties are created democratically and have a high degree of national consent 
and participation (Burke-White, 2001 :493). Their purpose is to facilitate a peaceful transition 
to democracy and/or facilitate a transition to a more human rights friendly regime (Slye, 
2002:246). Hence, they are aimed at achieving some form and level of accountability through 
a public investigatory process with a high degree of involvement by the public and victims of 
the crimes concerned, who are given space to question and challenge the amnesty (Slye, 
2002:245). 
This form of amnesty also provides some concrete form of reparation to the victims, for 
instance in the form of payment by the state (Slye, 2002:245). 
The most prominent example and the only one of its kind that comes close to qualify as an 
accountable amnesty is the South African amnesty. Provision for it was made by South 
Africa's Interim Constitution of 1993 and it was consolidated as the "Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act" by the new Parliament in 1994 (Burke-White, 2001 :494, Slye, 
2002:246). Although accountable amnesties do not formally punish their recipients, they 
provide a different kind of accountability on the basis of the public acknowledgement they 
demand of the responsible perpetrators. This offers an alternative to the traditional approach 











The following section will investigate the three main positions in transitional justice literature 
regarding the objectives of accountability for transitional states after mass gross human rights 
violations. For the purpose of this dissertation, they are called: 
1. The Prosecution and Punishment Position 
2. The General Amnesty Position 
3. The Truth Process Accompanied by Amnesty Approach 
4.4 The Transitional Justice Literature: 
A Normative Framework for Justice in Transitional States 
This section will investigate these three positions with the aim to analyse the implications of 
each in telTIlS of three basic criteria for holding individuals accountable (as investigated in 
Chapter One). The basic criteria are: 
4.4.1 
4.4.1.1 
1. Relational: a person is held accountable to someone or something, implying either 
an authority or rule of law 
2. According to some criteria: a person is held accountable either in terms of his or 
her delegated authority or in terms of a rule of law procedure 
3. Sanction: holding a person accountable involves a possible sanction. 
The Prosecution and Punishment Position 
l1ze Nuremberg Precedent 
In addressing gross human rights violations, the prosecutorial model aims to achieve 
retlibutive justice through three concrete means: investigation, adjudication and punishment 
(Slye, 2002: 186). 
Investigation, involving the ascertaining of truth or factual knowledge relevant to the crime, 











established, and punishment as a means by which the offender is sanctioned represents three 
main objectives: truth, responsibility and accountability (Slye, 2002: 187). 
In terms of our previous analysis of the basic criteria for holding individuals accountable, the 
prosecutorial model is relational in that it holds individuals accountable to the rule oflaw and 
works in accordance with the procedural requirements of due process in adjudicating 
responsibility. Thirdly, it also involves a sanction (punishment) in cases where an individual 
is found guilty of the charge of transgressing the law. Thus, the prosecutorial model fulfils all 
three basic criteria for holding individuals accountable to the law (Orentlicher, 1995:384). 
(One of the principal scholars who has taken the prosecution and punishment position is 
Diane Orentlicher (1995:375).) 
4.4.1.2 Lustration / Purges 
Alternative means, such as deprivation of political rights, excluding employment in public 
office (purges/lustration), deprivation of pension rights, and subjecting those perpetrators with 
civil responsibilities to civil suits, are lesser degrees of (and alternatives to) punishment, 
(Zalaquett, 1995:13, Mendez, 1996:230). However, in terms of the three basic criteria of 
accountability, lustration does not hold individuals accountable to the rule oflaw in which an 
accused can defend his or her case. Widely used in post-communist regimes in Eastern 
Europe after the end of the Cold War, lustration was used as a simple mechanism of 
sanctioning the previous officials under the communist rule by indiscriminately barring them 
from employment in the state (Rosenberg, 1999:348). E.g. in some parts of the former East 
Germany, women who had dished out food in the Stasi cafeteria would be ineligible to sweep 
streets (Rosenberg, 1999:348). 
4.4.2 The General Amnesty Position 
4.4.2.1 A Political Compromise 
The general amnesty position is divided between (a) the political compromise-objective and 











achieve accountability but argues that a political compromise with the previous authoritarian 
regime that involves a blanket or general amnesty is the price that has to be paid in order to 
make way for a peaceful transition to democracy when such a compromise is called for (Nino, 
1995:418). One of its central proponents is the late Argentine professor Carlos Nino (1995). 
The general amnesty position argues that, in transitions where the previous regime retains 
substantial political and military power, the political transition to a democratic regime should 
be prioritised above retributive justice, which is likely to trigger a political backlash (Nino, 
1995:418). Fundamentally, the general amnesty position prioritises other values than the 
prosecutorial model, i.e. reconciliation as a means of bringing together different opinions in a 
political system such as a democracy is valued above retribution as a means of punishing 
previous wrongs according to the rule of law. 
According to the general amnesty position, democracy is essential for the future protection of 
human rights and as a foundation for the establishment of rule oflaw as a mechanism to 
prevent violent means of solving conflict (Nino, 1995:419). This position thus values political 
transfonnation as a means to rule oflaw, as opposed to the rule oflaw as a means to political 
transformation (the prosecutorial position). 
Spain is the only example where a general amnesty and amnesia granted for the gross human 
rights violations committed at a large scale under the dictatorship of General Franco was 
generally approved and accepted by the society as a whole and in which the lack of 
accountability for the previous crimes did not cause any serious disturbances to the 
democratic transition (Aguilar, 2001 :92 - 118). 
However, general amnesty forecloses the possibility of civil suits and impedes investigation 
into past violations. It also rules out an adjudication process whereby responsible perpetrators 
may be identified (Burke-White, 2001:482). In addition, a general amnesty provides the 
perpetrators with legal immunity against further attempts at holding them accountable. Thus, 
since blanket and general amnesties preclude prosecutions of the worst and most serious 
violations of human rights as well as of the most responsible perpetrators, they do not fulfil 
any of the three basic criteria for holding individuals accountable (Slye, 2002: 187; Van Zyl, 











4.4.2.2 A Practical Compromise 
Post-conflict societies often do not have the resources needed for an immediate, full monetary 
compensation to victims (Morris, 1997:30). On the other hand, commitment towards the 
establishment of institutions dedicated to building a human rights culture, such as educational 
institutions and a general health-care system, may bypass the identificatory and definatory 
problems of direct monetary compensation and target the more general population of 
beneficiaries and systemised victims. These commitments value e.g. the importance of 
economic stability and equality above that of targeting the breach of specific individual rights. 
Mahmood Mamdani (1998: 13) is one of the scholars who has pointed out that, in societies 
that have been deeply engrossed in long-term political, social and economic inequality, 
accountability measures need to address the wider population of beneficiaries and victims of 
structural violations of basic human rights instead of viewing human rights in isolation of the 
wider social and economic context. An example would be the pass laws and forced removals 
of ethnic groups during the South African apartheid regime. 
Reparation is thus seen as a crucial component of both the restorative and preventative 
objectives of accountability measures in the sense the restoration of previous inequalities is 
more easily achieved in a socially and economically equal society and it would be better 
equipped to prevent future conflict (Zalaquett, 1995: 10- 11; Slye, 2002:245). 
Uruguay's transition in 1984 is an example in which a peaceful transition to civilian rule from 
the previous military dictatorship was the paramount objective (Zalaquett, 1995:28). The 
Colorado Party, with Julio Sanguinetti inaugurated as new President in 1984, granted the old 
regime general amnesty. This is similar to the acceptance of amnesia as in Spain, although in 
Uruguay the gross human rights violations were acknowledged through reparative measures 
and laws passed to facilitate the return ofthousands of Uruguayans in exile, giving back the 
former jobs of people who had been dismissed for political reasons and reimbursing former 











4.4.3 The Truth Process Accompanied by an Amnesty Approach 
4.4.3.1 A Truth Process Accompanied by General Amnesty 
The truth process accompanied by an amnesty argues for a restorative justice approach to past 
gross human rights violations. This approach argues that the need and right of victims or 
victims' families to know the truth is central to the justice needs in transitional states and that 
an investigative public procedure is more important and better satisfies the particular justice 
needs in transitional states/post conflict societies after mass gross human rights violations 
(Zalaquett, 1995:6 - 9). Such an investigative public procedure would be a way of morally 
sanctioning and imposing the norms of the society on past wrongdoers by making a public 
redress of the wrongs committed. 
The Chilean human rights activist and scholar, Jose Zalaquett, is one of the foremost 
advocates ofa "truth and justice as far as possible"-approach (Zalaquett, 1995:8). He argues 
that knowing the truth and redressing past wrongs are restorative in the sense that these 
functions attempt to restore moral dignity to those victims or victim's families who previously 
suffered deprivation of basic human rights (Zalaquett, 1995:6 7). Truth about the past 
provides a foundation for understanding and reconciling divisions among people, cultures and 
ideologies. The strongest argument of this approach is that a quasi-judicial official and public 
investigation and adjudication of crimes that exclude punishment as a sanction may better suit 
the justice needs in transitional states coming out of a past of vast scale gross human rights 
violations than prosecution and punishment (Slye, 2002:246; Zalaquett, 1995:12 -13; Nino, 
1995:419). 
When crimes under a previous regime which denied or kept them secret become public 
knowledge and officially acknowledged as truth, the truth ensures that future denial is no 
longer possible37 (Zalaquett, 1995:7). 
3
7 
An inquiry into the facts about how crimes were committed also exposes the lines of authorisation, details of 
planning, and how orders were made and executed which is a crucial prerequisite to a fair adjudication of 
responsibilities, understanding of obligatory forces (where crimes were committed under orders) and unravelling 
of the power of secret networks such as death squads, which often function on the sideline of authorised crime 
under repressive regimes. E.g. former South African President F.W. de Klerk denied that he ever had any 
knowledge of the existence of the secret police death squad at Vlaakplas under the Apartheid regime 











However, the truth process accompanied by a blanket or general amnesty nevertheless does 
not fulfil the three basic criteria for holding individuals accountable. In so far as a truth 
process achieves some of the fundamental justice needs of a transitional state and provides 
some relief to victims in terms of "truth findings," it may achieve some of the basic 
requirements of justice in such societies/states. However, as argued above, it is essential that 
the truth process is officially acknowledged and made public for it to achieve the targeted 
objective of the moral restoration of victims' dignity (Zalaquett, quoted in interview by Roht-
Arriaza, 1999: 197). 
4.4.3.2 A Truth Process Accompanied by Conditional Amnesty 
A truth process accompanied by a conditional amnesty, on the other hand, may claim to 
achieve some form of accountability by holding perpetrators accountable to someone (thus, 
fulfilling the relational criteria). This would be achieved by the perpetrators having to apply 
individually to a quasi-judicial jury and holding them accountable according to some set of a 
quasi-judicial conditions, e.g. fulfilling certain requirements, such as full disclosure of the acts 
for which amnesty is applied for (as was the case in the South African conditional amnesty). 
When, in addition, this process is public and officially sanctioned, it may be argued that it also 
to some extent achieves the sanctioning of the wrongdoers through moral condemnation. This, 
however, presupposes that the community in which the wrongdoers are being held 
accountable holds the same moral values as the quasi·judicial body adjudicating the 
responsibility for their past crimes. A (public and officially sanctioned) truth process 
accompanied by a conditional amnesty restricting amnesty to individual perpetrators and 
holding them accountable according to some criteria by a quasi-judicial body does comply 
with the three basic criteria for holding individuals accountable in so far as it incurs a possible 
sanction. Thus, in so far as holding individuals accountable requires a sanction, the objectives 
of this approach are comparable to the prosecution and punishment position. 
The restorative justice approach argue that acknowledgement of past crime and the suffering 











accountable in a highly unjust society where victims formerly were denied basic dignities of 
fundamental human rights38 (Simpson, 2002:230; Du Toit, 2000: 123). 
Finally, this chapter has argued that there are serious political and practical obstacles for 
transitional states to prosecute and punish past perpetrators for mass gross human rights 
violations committed under the previous authoritarian regime. These obstacles confront 
societies with crucial moral choices when attempting to hold these perpetrators accountable 
and also safeguard a peaceful transition to a democratic regime and human rights. According 
to our previous analysis of the basic criteria of holding individuals accountable in Chapter 
One, the Prosecution and Punishment Position and the Truth Process Accompanied by 
Conditional Amnesty are the only ones that make it possible to hold individuals accountable 
given the specific criteria as discussed above. 
This chapter has observed four main objectives from these three positions, which act as a 
normative framework of accountability objectives for transitional states: 
1. That the policy adoption of accountability measures satisfies popular sovereignty. 
(Thus, that it carries legitimacy. E.g. this rules out self-appointed amnesties (Slye, 
2002:245; Zalaquett, 1995:9; Van Zyl, 2000:52; Cassel, 1997:219) 
2. That past perpetrators be held individually accountable to a judicial or quasi-
judicial officially sanctioned body according to just criteria, which makes possible 
the adjudication of responsible individuals. (Slye, 2002:245; Van Zyl, 2000:53; 
Cassel, 1997:219; Zalaquett, 1995:6) 
3. That the previous mass gross human rights violations be investigated in order to 
bring out disclosure of previous crimes that have previously been denied, and that 
the previous governments' record of crimes be made public knoH:ledge and 
officially acknowledged. (Slye, 2002:245; Van Zy1, 2000:53; Cassel, 1997:219; 
Zalaquett, 1995:6) 
38 Such acknowledgement may achieve the societal need for moral redress and reconciliation, however where 
such measures do not include legal redress they forsake the victim's right to legal protection of human rights 
under international law (Slye, 2002: 182). Thus, a strong argument has been made in favour of a requirement for 
states to provide the victim a chance to challenge and question the decision to grant the perpetrator immunity for 











4. That reparation measures or compensation be offered to survivors, victims or 
victims' families. This requirement also involves the restoration or establishment 
of institutions that ensure equal representation, protection of rights etc. Such 
measures, although they do not specifically target former disadvantaged groups, 
are specifically advantageous to weakened groups in the society in general. These 
measures are particularly advised when deprivation of fundamental human rights 
and social and economic rights have been denied to a part of the population over a 
long period of time and caused deep inequalities in a society. (Slye, 2002:245; Van 
Zyl, 2000:53; Cassel, 1997:219; Zalaquett, 1995: 10) 
The final chapter will investigate to what extent and level the South African conditional 
amnesty process is comparable to the prosecutorial model. 
Chapter Five 
Conditional Amnesty and Accountability: The South African Case 
5.1 The Significance of the South African Amnesty 
In the light of the Nuremberg precedent, the South African amnesty is the latest and most 
controversial amnesty law. The South African criteria for amnesty were based on precisely 
the opposite premise to that of the Nuremberg precedent. One of its central requirements for 
amnesty was that the applicant had to have acted in the execution of an order, or on behalf of 
or with the approval of a political organisation, institution, liberation movement or the former 
state of which the applicant had been a member or a supporter (Republic of South Africa, Act 
No. 34 of 1995, Sec. 20 (2) (3) (e». 
In doing so, the South African government accepted due obedience as a legitimate excuse for 
gross human rights violations if the perpetrator could prove that he or she did not act with 
moral autonomy but in line with an official political ideology, motive and policy in 











Compared with previous truth commissions, the South African TRC and amnesty process 
excels in four particular areas: its democratic crafting, its public nature and process, its 
investigative and quasi-judicial powers, and its integrated goal of reconciliation (Hayner, 
2001 :36-39), providing the most consistent alternative to the traditional framework of 
retributive justice (Popkin and Bhuta, 1999: 11 0). These aspects of the South African amnesty 
has made it a reference point for a different kind of amnesty process, which is not a general or 
blanket amnesty but individual and conditional on full disclosure involving a public process 
and public hearings for victims (Hayner, 2001 :33). 
The special significance of the SA amnesty is thus twofold: on the one hand the innovation of 
an individual amnesty conditional on full disclosure raises the prospect of an accountable 
amnesty, while on the other hand its use of amnesty, and more specifically the requirement of 
a political objective, goes directly against the Nuremberg model. For these reasons the South 
African amnesty provides an especially relevant test case for the main problem of this thesis, 
i.e. whether or in what sense amnesty can be comparable with accountability. 
This chapter will first briefly sketch the transitional context of the South African amnesty and 
then examine the goals, functions and objectives of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which were established by the Promotion of National 
Unity and Reconciliation Act (Republic of South Africa Act No. 34 of 1995, hereafter 
referred to as "the TRC Act") in 1995 with the mandate to grant amnesty to perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations for the past 34 years. 
More specifically, the following analysis will examine the significance and objcctives of the 
South African amnesty process in terms of the TRC's own interpretation as stated in its 
Interim Report of 1998 and the Supplementary Volumes, including the findings and 
recommendations of the Amnesty Committee as handed to President Thabo Mbeki in March 
2003. The TRC's own interpretation is fundamental to understanding the reasons and goals of 
the South African amnesty and, in tum, how accountability was thought to be achieved. 
The final section of this chapter will review the TRC amnesty criteria, discuss its implications 
for individual accountability, and consider whether and to what extent the criteria set by the 
South African amnesty can comply with the basic criteria for holding individuals accountable 
and can fulfil the justice objectives required by transitional states/post-conflict societies in the 











Thus the focus of this chapter is: 
1. What is the significance of the South African amnesty in relation to individual 
accountability for mass gross human rights violations and due obedience to 
orders 
2. What were the main objectives of the amnesty process (as conducted by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission) 
3. To what extent, level and degree did it achieve individual accountability that may 
be comparable to prosecution and punishment 
First however, a historical background leading up to the political settlement of the apartheid 
struggle will be given as a starting point from which the goals, objectives and finally criteria 
of the amnesty can be discussed and analysed. 
5.2 The Transitional Context: A Political Settlement 
The granting of amnesty in South Africa in 1994 for the human rights violations that took 
place under 40 years of racial discrimination, for the atrocities committed by both the former 
apartheid regime and the opposition movement needs to be understood in the context of the 
political settlement which paved the way for the creation of a new Constitution based on 
democratic rule (Van Zyl, 1999:649). 
White domination had prevailed for more than 200 years since the colonial conquest of the 
South African land, beginning with the first migration of white settlers to the Cape in the mid-
17th century. White supremacy and minority rule was further entrenched after Union in 1910 
and significantly through the National Party's apartheid policy that legalised racial separation 
after 1948 (TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch. 2, 1998:40; Boraine, 2000: 141). 
Apartheid systematised racial discrimination through the deprivation of the basic political, 
social and economic rights of the majority non-white population with detailed regulations 
restricting their movement, education, work, residence and personal relationships (Boraine, 











By the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the liberation movements commanded the support of 
the overwhelming majority of South African citizens. In addition, the liberation struggle 
gained international support for the call for democracy and as a result South Africa was 
subjected to a concerted international campaign of economic sanctions, as well as athletic, 
academic, scientific and cultural boycotts (Van Zyl, 1999:649). 
Nevertheless, the anti-apartheid resistance movement and liberation struggle were unable to 
overthrow the apartheid state as it could be contained, for the most part, by security forces 
(Van Zyl, 1999:649). Consequently, it took the ruling minority and the majority a four year 
long negotiation process convened through the CODESA (Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa) in order to reach the final settlement of the Interim Constitution in 1993. (McGregor, 
2001 :33). 
Outsider observers have called the four-year South African negotiation process, which 
resulted in the democratic elections in 1994, "a miracle" (McGregor, 2001 :33). However, to 
South Africans the transition was characterised by years of bargaining in the context of 
ongoing bloody violence, the eruption of which into full-scale civil war was only avoided due 
to the unique balance of power or stalemate between the anti-apartheid resistance movements 
and the former government (McGregor, 2001 :33; Van Zyl, 1999:648). 
The nature of the South African negotiated transition was thus that of a political compromise 
between a powerful minority regime which did not harbour a genuine will to achieve 
democracy and the mass liberation movements which had not been successful in removing the 
previous regime from power by military force (McGregor, 2001 :33; Van Zyl, 1999:649). 
Based on mutual dependency, the two sides arrived at a commitment to a political settlement 
that emphasised democracy and reconciliation as the over arching cornerstones for a future of 
coexistence (McGregor, 2001 :34). 
According to Samuel P. Huntington's worldwide empirical study of different types of 
democratic transitions, three typologies can be made: "transformations," "replacements" and 
"transplacements" (Huntington, 1995:66). According to Huntington's study, the implications 
for transitional justice suggest that in "replacements," where an overthrow of a regime takes 











whereas in "transplacements," which involve a negotiated settlement, the option of 
prosecutions is usually blocked due to the balance of power, and the transition to democracy 
is thus typically facilitated through political deals on amnesty (Huntington, 1995:81 )39. Thus, 
according to Huntington's study (1995:81), if we compare the political transitions within 
which the South African TRC ("transplacement") and the Nuremberg ("replacement") were 
located, the options and possibilities for successful prosecutions were thus much greater in the 
Post-World War Two context than after the political settlement in South Africa. 
Amnesty also was a necessary component of the South African negotiated settlement: 
prosecution of perpetrators of human rights violations amongst the previous government and 
its military and police was impossible as they included the personnel needed to implement 
prosecutions and to safeguard free elections (Van Zyl, 1999:650). Without securing the 
agreement of the military and security forces of the former regime, it would not have been 
possible to proceed to the founding democratic election in 1994. However, these security 
forces included many of the perpetrators of political atrocities, and they required amnesty as 
the price for agreeing to safeguard the elections (Boraine, 2000: 143). Thus the Interim 
Constitution of 1993 recognised that amnesty for the past human rights abuse was necessary 
in order to secure a (peaceful) transition to the new democratic elections and to bring all sides 
of the previous conflict into the nation-building enterprise (Van Zyl, 1999:649). 
According to Rosenberg's distinctions between "a regime of criminals," "a criminal regime" 
and "ethnic conflict," South Africa profoundly harboured a mix of all three elements40, 
although the apartheid system essentially had the characteristics of a criminal regime, which 
was institutionalised and required widespread societal compliance (Rosenberg, 1999:339, 349 
and 352). Thus, in the case of dealing with a prior regime of criminals with relatively clear-
cut distinctions between perpetrators and victims, the question at issue would primarily be 
that of individual accountability (of the individual perpetrators), which may also satisfy the 
39 In "transformations" the authoritarian regime is stronger than the opposition and thus plays the decisive role in 
ending the regime and transforming it into a democratic system. However, the opposition might gain strength in 
the process or at least exercise some amount of pressure to liberalise the state. Thus, the distinction between 
"transplacements" and "transformations" is fuzzy (Huntington, 1995:65). Hence, according to Huntinton's study 
the option or possibility of successful prosecution of the authoritarian regime is not greater in "transformations" 
than in "transplacements" (Huntington, 1995:81), In so far as the liberation movement in South Africa was 
unable to overthrow the apartheid government and the apartheid government initiated talks with liberation leader 
Nelson Mandela while still in prison and the liberation movement thus exercised a great amount of pressure 
during the democratisation process, the South African transition also bears elements of "transformations", 
40 See a brief introduction of Rosenberg's authoritarian regime classifications in Chapter One under section 1.1, 











needs of victims. However, in the case of a criminal regime where the distinctions between 
perpetrators, victims, collaborators, bystanders and beneficiaries are not so clear-cut, it is not 
so certain that it would be appropriate to have only a perpetrator-focused accountability. In 
this case it may be more appropriate to extend the quest for accountability beyond individual 
perpetrators (to possibly include collaborators, beneficiaries etc) and devise other means to 
deal with the truth needs of victims. 
The challenge for the founders of the new South African Constitution was thus to deal with a 
past in which violence was widespread, deep as well as targeted at specific groups divided 
along complex racial, ethnic and political lines (Rosenberg, 1999:352 - 353). The appropriate 
approach therefore required a means of accountability which would concern the wider society 
of responsible bystanders, collaborators and beneficiaries as well as the particular perpetrators 
involved in heinous crimes (Rosenberg, 1999:353; TRC Report, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 1998: 130). 
Given the great number of political atrocities committed and covered up under Apartheid and 
during the anti-Apartheid struggle, there was a great need for the disclosure of the truth about 
these crimes (TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 1998:128). On the other hand, the prosecution ofthe 
perpetrators (according to Rosenberg and Huntington's classifications) would not necessarily 
be the most effective way of establishing the truth about such atrocities; indeed, the threat of 
prosecution inhibited disclosures by the responsible perpetrators (TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 
t 998: 123). Since amnesty was part of the political settlement, the question was whether the 
amnesty process could be structured in a way that would facilitate the disclosure of truth 
about the atrocities by making this a condition for amnesty (TRC Report Vol. I, Ch. 5, 
1998: 118). This resulted in a novel attempt to integrate accountability into an individualised 
and conditional amnesty process with a public truth process that would publicly disclose 
investigations, evidence and witness accounts of past violations. 
Conditional amnesty was thus considered a middle path, or "the third way," between the 
options of the prosecutorial model of the Nuremberg Tribunal on the one hand and general 
amnesties allowing total immunity on the other (Boraine, 2000:141; Van Zyl, 1999:648; TRC 
Report Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 1998: 118). This option, both in relation to the nature ofthe previous 
regime and the nature of the transition, was arguably a favourable way of optimising the 
possibilities for holding the perpetrators of past gross human rights violations accountable 











F or our purposes, the relevant question is whether such amnesty conditional on full disclosure 
would amount to a form of accountability comparable to that sought by criminal prosecution. 
Thus the next two sections will investigate what exactly were the objectives, functions and 
specific criteria of the South African amnesty. 
5.3 The Goals, Objectives and Functions of the South African Conditional Amnesty: 
Reconciliation, Truth and Accountability 
The Interim Constitution of 1993 marked the beginning of a historical shift from the apartheid 
regime to a new democratic form of government based on the rule of Jaw and equality of 
human rights. The Postamble of the Interim Constitution stated: 
This Constitution provides a historic bridge behveen the past of a deeply divided 
society ( . .) 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of South 
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife in the past ( ... J 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but 
not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu but 
not for victimisation. 
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnes~v shall be granted 
in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with political objectives and 
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. 
(Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993 in Government 
Gazette, 1994: 180) 
Although the Interim Constitution did not state how amnesty was to be granted, it did provide 
the objectives of granting amnesty; namely "in order to advance ... reconciliation and 
reconstruction" (Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No. 200 of 1993 in 
Government Gazette, 1994: 180). Thus, whereas the new Constitution established the 
foundation for a new liberal democratic legal and moral order based on equal human rights for 
all South African people, it left it to Parliament to provide "the mechanisms, criteria and 











Africa Act No. 200 of 1993 in Government Gazette, 1994: 182). 
In 1995, the new democratically elected Parliament then specified these mechanisms, criteria 
and procedures with accountability as an evident objective by the adoption of the TRC Act. 
The founders of the new Constitution emphasised the need to morally condemn the past 
injustices as well as the need for a future peaceful co-existence based on democracy and 
respect for equal human rights. This called for an accountability process that had elements of 
both a "forward-looking" as well as a "backward-looking" approach and which emphasised 
restorative as opposed to retributive means to reconcile the divisions of the past (see excerpt 
from the Postamble in the previous section) (TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch. 4, 1998:49). 
1. Reconciliation 
Reconciliation was thus viewed by the founders of the TRC as both a process, making 
reconciliation possible, and a goal, securing the foundation of a future based on 
respect for fundamental and equal human rights (TRC Report, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 
1998:106). 
The objectives of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and 
reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past.. .. 4 ! (The TRC Act, Sec. (2) (3) (1» 
Truth and accountability were primary means by which justice through reconciliation 
and peace among the people of South Africa could become possible. Thus, the TRC 
Act mandated the Commission the following: 
2. Truth: 
(To establish) as complete a picture as possible ofthe causes, nature and extent 
of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the 
41 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission stated further that its aim was to facilitate reconciliation as a 
restoration of the relationship between offender and victim at three different levels: at the inter-personal realm, at 
the local community realm and on a national level. The central focus of the restorative justice process of South 
Africa was nevertheless participation by the immediately affected parties; that is, the victim and the offender 











period from 1 st March 1960 to the cut-off date [10th May 199442], including the 
antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as 
the perspectives of the victims and the motives and perspectives of the persons 
responsible for the commission of the violations, by conducting investigations 
and holding hearings. (TRC Act, Sec. (1) (3) (1) (a» 
To the objective of truth the Commission's objective was also to "establish ... and 
(make) known the fate or whereabouts of victims and by restoring the human and civil 
dignity of such victims by granting them an opportunity to relate their own accounts of 
the violations of which they are the victims, and by recommending reparation 
measures in respect of them" (TRC Act, Sec. (1) (3) (1) (c». 
3. Accountability: 
(To facilitate) the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of 
all the relevant facts relating to acts associated with a political objective and 
comply with the requirements of this Act. (TRC Act, Sec. (1) (3) (1) (b» 
Finally, the Commission was set to compile the collected information in all three areas 
in a final report providing "as comprehensive an account as possible of the activities 
and findings of the Commission,,43 (TRC Act, Sec. (1) (3) (1) (d». 
For these three main purposes, the TRC was invested with special powers such as subpoena 
and search and seizure in order to comply with its objectives (TRC Act, Sec. (2) (5». The 
three different main objectives (reconciliation, truth and accountability) were divided into 
thrce and carried out by three different sub-committees of the TRC, which were inter-
dependent and together comprised the Commission: 
1. The Human Rights Violations Committee 
Objective: 
Investigation of human rights violations 
Role: 
42 Acually the Postamble stipulated the cut-off date as 6 December 1993. This was later amended after some 
controversy. 
43 The TRCs find;ngs were presented in a five-volume report and handed to President Nelson Mandela on the 











"(I)nstitute the inquiries into gross human rights violations"; gather the information 
and receive the evidence and testimonies from victims, determine facts concerning 
such abuses and record allegations and complaints of gross violations of human 
rights" (TRC Act, Sec. (3) (14) (1». The Human Rights Violations Committee was 
also made accountable to the overall Commission by being required to submit a 
comprehensive report of all its activities and findings (TRC Act, Sec. (3) (14) (2». 
In cases where it found that a gross violation of human rights had taken place, it 
was responsible for referring the matter to the Committee on Reparation and 
Rehabilitation (TRC Act, Sec. (3) (15». 
2. The Amnesty Committee 
Objective: 
Adjudicate accountability and grant amnesty for gross human rights violations 
Role: 
Adjudicate and facilitate the granting of amnesty to persons who make full 
disclosure of all the relevant facts associated with a political objective and whose 
applications otherwise comply with the requirements of the Act (TRC Act, Sec. (4) 
(20) (1) (a) - (c». The specitic criteria for the granting of amnesty will be 
discussed in detail below. 
3. The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee 
Objective: 
Reparation and rehabilitation of victims 
Role: 
Consider matters referred to it (by the other committees and the investigative unit) 
concerning gross human rights violations and make recommendations which 
include appropriate measures for reparations to victims (TRC Act, Sec. (5) (25». 
To this end the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee's role was to make 
findings regarding "any person who is in the opinion that he or she has suffered 
harm as a result of a gross human rights violation" (TRC Act, Sec. (5) (26». Its 
activities, findings and recommendations were to be compiled in a comprehensive 
report submitted to the Commission, the implementation of which would depend 











The TRC Act also set out the specific requirements for the procedure under which amnesty 
was to be granted. In accordance with the stipulation in the Postamble, amnesty was restricted 
to a specific time period (1 st March 1960 _10th May 1994) and applied to politically motivated 
gross human rights offences where the Amnesty Committee was satisfied that the applicant 
had made full disclosure of the relevant acts. The names of the persons granted amnesty 
would be made public and, once granted amnesty, the successful applicant may not be held 
criminally liable for the act(s) for which he or she was granted amnesty44 (TRC Act, Sec. (20) 
(3 - 7». 
Thus the three essential criteria for amnesty were: 1) individual applications, 2) political 
objective and 3) full disclosure. 
1. Individual Applications: 
Amnesty applied to individual applicants who had made sworn statements and 
applied by submitting by 14th December 1997 fonnal application forms concerning 
crimes committed within the time period of 1 st March 1960 (the month in which 
the Sharpeville massacre took place, signifying the beginning of the armed struggle 
between the liberation movements and the apartheid government) and loth May 
1994 (the inauguration of President NelsoJ) Mandela as the first democratically 
elected President of South Africa}. These procedures provided a fonnal and equal 
basis for further investigating applications for amnesty (TRC Act, Sec. (20) (1); 
TRC Report Vol. 6, Ch 1 2003:8; TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch 6, 1998: 156). 
2. Political Objective: 
Amnesty was restricted to gross human rights violations committed with political 
motivations in the context of the struggle of the past. The aim of this requirement 
was to preclude amnesty from common crimes, crimes committed with personal 
malice and/or personal gain (TRC Act, Prelude; TRC Act, Sec. (1) (20) (2) (f); 
TRC Report, Vol. 6, Ch. 1,2003:7). 
44 In total the amnesty committee received 7115 amnesty applications. Of these, 1167 Gust over 13 %) received 
amnesty and 5505 (77,3 %) were refused. Most of the amnesty applications (5489) were dealt with 
administratively in chambers where the committee was satisfied that it was clear-cut and where the otfence did 
not concern a gross human rights violation (TRC Report Vol. 6 Sec. 1 Ch. 2,2003:22,36,47). The majority of 
the cases dealt with in chambers were refused on the grounds that the offence was not associated with a political 
objective (TRC Report Vo!' 6 Sec. 1 Ch. 2,2003:36; Vol. 1 Ch. 10, 1998:276). The remaining 1626 were dealt 
with in public hearings. 2548 hearings were held (the discrepancy is caused by the fact that some applicants 











3. Full Disclosure: 
Amnesty was restricted to perpetrators who would provide full disclosure of the 
crime(s) for which they applied. The aim of this requirement was to provide 
victims' families with knowledge of the whereabouts and graves of their beloved 
ones, as well as provide the infonnation needed for allocating responsibility for the 
crimes and establishing the causes, nature and consequences of the violent conflict 
ofthe past (TRC Act, Sec. (20) (1) ( c); TRC Report Vol. 6, Ch 1 2003: 10). 
5.3.1 The Task of Defining, IdentifYing and Adjudicating Political Objective 
The problem with defining politically motivated crime arises in international law as a result of 
the exception made to politically motivated crime in extradition treaties45 (Keightley, 
1993:339). There is no international consensus on the definition, interpretation and 
application of politically motivated crime (Slye, 2000: 179). 
The guidelines for adjudicating political objective in the National Unity and Reconciliation 
Act were derived from those fonnulated on the basis of the predominant jurisprudence of 
extradition law in Europe and elsewhere by the internationally acclaimed Danish ex-President 
ofthe European Commission on Human Rights, Carl Nordgaard when acting as an external 
international jurist for the parties involved in the negotiation for independence of Namibia 
from South Afnca in 1989 (Keightley, 1993:344; TRC Report, VoL 6, Sec. 1, Ch. 1 :8). The 
context of the South West African Peoples' Organisation's (SWAPO) struggle against the 
occupation of the South African government had similar features to that of the South African 
apm1heid struggle. Prior to the political settlement, Namibia had been in a state of war and the 
human rights offences involved indiscriminate violence against civilians. Thus there was a 
need to distinguish politically motivated acts which were committed to further the aims of the 
struggle although there would be no blanket indemnity for such acts (Keightley, 1993:346). 
However, the Norgaard principles recognised that there was no clear line demarcating 
combatants from civilians, since combatants were not wearing unifonns. The Nordgaard 
-~-----.-----
45 "Political exception" clauses in treaties between states are common and their effect is to exempt a state from 












principles thus served as a relevant guideline for the adjudication of amnesty in the South 
African context in which a violent struggle had been waged between the majority of the 
population's oppressed civilians and a powerful minority government (Keightley, 1993:346). 
The guiding principles adopted from Nordgaard for determining political objective as 
stipulated in the TRC Act were that the following needed to be taken into consideration: 
a. The motivation of the offender who committed the act, omission or offence 
b. The context of the act; whether the act, omission or offence was committed in 
the context of a political uprising, disturbance or reaction thereto 
c. The legal or factual nature of the act, omission or offence; specifically in 
relation to the gravity of the act, omission or offence 
d. The object or objective of the act, omission or offence; specifically whether the 
act, omission or offence was primarily directed at a political opponent or State 
personnel or State property as opposed to individuals and private property 
e. Whether the act, omission or offence was committed on the order of, on behalf 
of or ).vith the approval of the political organisation, institution, liberation 
movement or body of which the person was a member, agent or supporter 
f. The relationship between the offence and the political objective being pursued; 
specifically whether the act, omission or offence was proportionate to the 
political objective being pursued, as opposed to acting out of (i) personal gain, 
such as money or anything of material value and (U) personal or ill-willed 
malice. 
(TRC Act, Sec. (20) (2) (a) - (t) in Keightley, 1993:345) 
The South African Interim government made three important amendments with regard to the 
original Nordgaard principles. The first was in relation to the second criterion regarding 
whether the offence was committed in the context of a political uprising or disturbance, where 












The second amendment was with regard to the fourth criterion, where the term "government" 
in Nordgaard was replaced with "political opponent" (TRC Act, Sec. (20) (2) (d), Keightley, 
1993:347, here as "(iv")). 
The third important amendment was the addition of the one criterion, (the fifth one listed 
above), which reads: "whether the act, omission or offence was committed in the execution of 
an order of, or on behalf of, or with the approval of, the organisation, institution, liberation 
movement or body of which the person who committed the act was a member, an agent or a 
supporter." (TRC Act, Sec.(20) (2) (e)). 
There were three crucial implications for the adjudication of responsibility and definition of 
political offence of these amendments. Firstly they extended the definition of political 
offences to cover acts committed against political opponents other than the government 
(Keightley, 1993 :347). Thus, members of one political organisation who had committed 
offences against a rival political organisation would be eligible for amnesty (Keightley, 
1993:347). Secondly, all the amendments favoured govemment agents who had committed 
offences against political activists and would thereby also be eligible to apply for amnesty 
(Keightley, 1993:347). Thirdly and significantly, contrary to the Nuremberg precedent, 
atrocities committed on behalf of or with the approval of a political organisation were 
accepted as acts committed with a political motive that therefore served as an excuse to make 
offenders who acted under orders eligible for amnesty. 
In essence, these c11teria were based on the notion that political motivation resides in the 
person's (political) duties and the expressed or implied authorisation from a political 
authority and applied to anyone who acted with reasonable grounds for believing that he or 
she was doing so in the course and scope of his or her implied or expressed authorisation from 
the relevant political authority (TRC Act, Sec. (20) (2) (c)). 
5.4 The Implications of Favouring Politically Motivated Crime 
In different ways the criterion of political objectives for amnesty is problematic: in an 











violence such as criminal or personal violence. This would be the case where the perpetrators 
of gross human rights violations which had been committed with political objectives would 
qualify for amnesty and the perpetrators of criminal or personal violence would not. 
There are two general problems with so favouring politically motivated gross human rights 
violations. The first is related to the implications of favouring politically motivated human 
rights violations in a society which seeks to establish a human rights culture in which no one 
is above the law. This falls short of establishing the norm that all violations of human rights 
are categorically ruled out by effectively implying that politically motivated human rights 
violations can be justified or excused. (We will return to these implications below.) 
The second problem relates to the specific decisions which the Amnesty Committee made in 
applying this criterion and the theoretical and practical difficulties it inevitably encountered in 
defining and adjudicating politically motivated crime as distinct from criminal or other non-
political violations of human rights (Slye, 2000:175 and 181; Fullard and Rousseau, 2003:205 
213; Simpson, 2002:245). 
By privileging politically motivated gross human rights violations and acts committed as 
orders, Dn behalf of or in the support of a particular political organisation or ideology, the 
South African amnesty in effect departed from and contradicted the basic tenet of 
international law established by the Nuremberg trial that following orders is an illegitimate 
claim of defence for which no exception can be made (TRC Act, Sec. (20) (2); Slye, 2000: 180 
181; Simpson, 2002:245). From a general restorative and preventative perspective, such 
privileging may be justified on the grounds that the violence associated with a particular 
political objective is bound to loose its justificatory force once a society undergoes political 
change and it becomes possible to resolve conflict by non-violent means (Slye, 2000: 181). 
However, Simpson (2002:245) has pointed out that such "privileging" of political violence 
nevertheless has the negative effect of denigrating and masking the relevance of other factors 
such as race, class or gender as relevant dynamics in understanding the dominant patterns of 
gross violations of human rights under apartheid. The problem with prioritising politically 
motivated gross human rights violations as eligible for amnesty is that it by implication finds 











In the context of the South African amnesty process, the direct consequence of this 
interpretation is that individuals could use political organisations' stated aims as an excuse for 
having committed gross human rights violations using the argument that they believed that 
these acts furthered the organisations' cause on the one hand, and on the other, that political 
leaders could deny moral responsibility for having ordered gross human rights violations 
where such orders were made implicitly and no evidence of explicit orders existed. Former 
defence minister, Magnus Malan, who did not apply for amnesty, was for instance acquitted 
after an unsuccessful and costly state prosecution for the ordering of gross human rights 
violations due to lack of evidence, and no "hard evidence" was found to prove that former 
President P. W. de Klerk had ordered similar acts or even been aware of the existence ofthe 
ClIC10 unit of the Security Police situated at Vlakplaas, the apatiheid government's 
notorious death squad (TRC Report Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 1998:123; TRC Report Vol. 6, Sec. 1 Ch. 4, 
2003:58 62; Gottschalk, 2002:241 and 250). 
Granting amnesty for human rights atrocities committed with a political objective also places 
a fair amount of power with the former state, political patiies and political organisations 
(Slye, 2000: 180). Thus amnesty to perpetrators who disclosed their crimes often depended on 
the acknowledgement by political leaders that such orders had been given (Slye, 2000: 180). 
However, in practice few political leaders came forward to the TRC and accepted 
responsibility for having ordered such atrocities. As Simpson argues, "(t)he simple political 
narrative that remains is striking in the way it cleanses both liberation politics and state 
violence - associated as they were with the fortunes of particular political parties and 
movements - of the criminal pathologies of South Africa's particular social dislocation" 
(Simpson, 2002:245). 
The authorised version of the past (of the TRC Report), argues Simpson, "ignores the extent 
to which the apartheid system that criminalised politics simultaneously politicised crime" 
(Simpson,2002:245). Due to the complexity of the historical patterns of conflict, dislocation, 
dispossession and industrialisation under Apartheid, the motivations for criminal acts were 
typically complex and not easily identified or legitimised along political lines (Simpson, 
2002:245). Where proof of authorisation was missing and an act was determined as political 
according to whether it was consistent with the general ideology of the political organisation, 
the lines of responsibility remained blurred (Slye, 2000: 180). Hence, restricting amnesty to 











against the notion that every individual is responsible for his or her own actions will in 
practical terms it becomes difficult to define "political motivation." On the practical side of 
this dilemma we know from the social sciences that although individuals are responsible for 
their own actions, they can not always be held accountable for (all of) them, particularly in 
relation to acts committed in response to orders. 
The dilemma with which this thesis has sought to grapple is which criteria may be useful for 
determining individual accountability. 
The South African amnesty chose to base such criteria on the perpetrators' political aspiration 
in the past conflict. However the definition of what constitutes "political objective" turned out 
to be a double-edged sword; on the one hand, political accountability did not address 
individual accountability for obedience to orders, since such acts, omissions or offences were 
accepted as "political motivation" committed as part of a "political objective." On the other 
hand, political accountability offered an opportunity for political leaders to deny their 
involvement as instigators and not accept responsibility for having ordered and commanded 
gross human rights violations, since very little evidence could be brought against their 
explicit, implicit and factual participation. Where the TRC was successful in compiling 
sufficient evidence for bringing some of these leaders to court for having either denied their 
responsibility or failed to apply for amnesty, political and moral unwillingness, lack of 
resources aad overload of present and persistent common crime in the society made such 
prosecution impossible at the end of the amnesty process (TRC Report, Vol. 1, Ch. 5, 
1998:132; Tutu, Foreword in TRC Report, Vol. 6,2003). 
It could thus be argued that the South African amnesty provisions, by making political 
motivation a criterion for granting amnesty for disclosed gross human rights violations, in 
effect restored the traditional defence of "superior orders," thus setting itself against the basic 
precedent established by the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
To those who regard Nuremberg as the paradigm for establishing individual accountability for 
human rights violations, this must amount to nothing less than an explicit rejection of 
individual accountability for human rights violations. Thus Ronald Slye, for example, argues 
that, by granting amnesty to an offender on the basis that he or she acted with a political 











principle that an individual is morally and legally responsible for the consequences of his or 
her own actions" (Slye, 2000:181). 
Again~t this, we argued above that the basic requirement of amnesty conditional on full 
disclosure did imply a form of individual accountability even if this did not amount to 
criminal ac(.;Ountability. The key question is what this form of individual accountability 
amounts to, especiaUy if this is also combined with the more specific criterion of having 
political motivation for the human rights violations disclosed. 
By granting amnesty for politically motivated human rights crimes, the South African 
amnesty process accepted that, in their capacity as Im.~mbers, employers, supporters and 
political leaders of various politkal organisations, individual political actors subscribed to the 
polilical objectives of those organisations but should not be held liable for the overall moral or 
politic:.!] aims of the movements and organisations to which they belonged as they would be 
for their own indi'lidm1! and personal aims. The implication is that perpetrators of human 
rights violations could be held individually accountable, if at all, only for the means by which 
they sought {O achieve political goals (TRC Report Vol. 6, Sec. 1, Ch.3, 2003:647). 
It meW be noted tbat thi~ would roughly correspond to the approach taken by the Argentine 
Due Obedience law, which in this respect also departed from the Nuremberg precedent46• The 
impl;cation is also that there is no provision for a\~countabi!ity at the level of the overall 
potitici.'J Dbjcctives of the orgnnisations or movements concemed. 
Here the analysis ortlle lthlral dilemma of "dirty hands" by Walzer and Thompson discussed 
in Chapter One is relevant in so far as lhere appears to be all acceptance that, in political 
conflicts s!.lch u.s civil war or liheration struggles, the overall political objectives will 
necessitate th~ use of "evil means" such as killings ill the course of an armed struggle. 
Accordingly, the South Afriean amnesty process sought to indemnify offenders who could 
prove that their human rights violations were poiitically motivated by virtue of their position 
as represt~ntatives as well as the represeGtative nature of their goals. 
46 See above Chapter Three section 3.5 The Argentine Due Obedience Law: A Legal Framework of 











In the final analysis however, the crux of the attempt to achieve accountability in the South 
African conditional amnesty is related to the requirement of full disclosure. 
Conclusion 
Accountability through Disclosure: Public Acknowledgement and Moral Censure 
Insufficient attention has been paid to the key question whether, or to what extent, conditional 
amnesty amounts to a fonn of accountability. Instead commentators have been more 
concerned with issues of truth versus justice. They have, for instance, focused on the trade-off 
of indemnity for human rights abuses in exchange for full disclosure (Van Zyl, 1999) and the 
carrot-and-stick dynamics of the threat of criminal prosecutions when amnesty was not 
obtained (Simpson, 2002). 
The question is, more precisely, whether, or in what sense, the requirement of full disclosure 
mig.~t be considered to be a fonn of accountability even if it is not followed by punishment. 
This was highlighted by the approach adopted by the TRC. For the TRC the achievement of 
accountability fundamentally depended on the understanding that the disclosure of gross 
human rights violations meant that they were implicitly censured as "wrong". 
Here one needs to distinguish between the moral condemnation of crimes on the one hand and 
the criminal and political sanctions of the responsible offenders on the other. 
Regarding the moral condemnation of crimes, a further distinction needs to be made. 
Responsibility should not be confused with acknowledging that someone should be held 
accountable for the offence. E.g. someone could accept responsibility for an offence without 
accepting that they should be held accountable for it. But, while the amnesty criteria did not 
require a fonnal apology or sincere moral repentance by the offender (who would thereby 
admit that he/she should be held accountable) the objective was nevertheless to hold him/her 
accountable by implicitly being subject to moral censure. Hence, acknowledging culpability 











Thus, by publicly declaring the nature of their offences, applicants would effectively 
acknowledge their culpability47, i.e. that they are deserving of censure and therefore in some 
sense accountable. For this to work the full disclosure oftheir killings, tortures etc. would 
need to take place within a moral context in which they would be understood as gross human 
rights violations. 
In this regard, the significance of making full disclosure as a requirement for amnesty is that it 
is a way of asserting that the culpability of perpetrators of human rights abuses is not only a 
matter of privately or personally being responsible as an individual moral agent (such as in the 
Weberian sense of the suffering servant, see Chapter One). The requirement of full disclosure 
effectively insists that the amnesty applicant is a member of a moral, civil and political 
community and accountable to that community. This sense of a moral community needed to 
be created by the TRC. 
A shortcoming of the TRC process is that it gave priority to politically motivated crimes that 
are difficult to define. It was difficult to hold perpetrators accountable according to political 
objectives and to identifY and adjudicate responsibility. It was, on the one hand, possible for 
the most responsible perpetrators, i.e. those who instigated, planned and ordered the 
commission of gross human rights violations, to deny responsibility whereas, on the other 
hand, those who actually executed gross human rights violations were not held criminally 
accountable due to the fact that they did so under orders and where therefore eligible for 
amnesty. The result was often that the buck did not stop anywhere. 
Theoretically the founders of the new South African Constitution and the TRC could have 
considered other possible forms of civil and political sanctions, e.g. lustration or purges based 
on a quasi-legal due process. Thus one could conceive of an amnesty process conditional on 
full disclosure that does not result in criminal punishment but does involve exclusion from 
defined public and political positions in future. This kind of lustration would necessarily be 
coupled with a legal process that can prove individuals guilty and in which they have a right 
to defend themsel ves. 
Significantly the South African amnesty process did not result in civil or political sanctions of 











this kind, leaving the possible moral censure or condemnation as the only relevant sanction. 
The condition of full disclosure did impose a form of public accountability but without either 
criminal or civil or political sanctions involved. This amounts at best to liability for public 
condemnation of moral guilt. 
Moreover, the significance of due process with regard to amnesty hearings meant that the 
requirement of full disclosure amounted to a quasi-judicial determination of guilt even ifno 
punishment resulted, as opposed to a form of public shaming where no acknowledgement of 
guilt was needed. In a certain sense, therefore, the amnesty hearings provided a forum for 
morally condemning the perpetrators for their morally heinous acts. Thus, in so far as the 
disclosures required for the amnesty process took the quasi-legal form of due process and 
specifically involved individual accountability, these could thus be argued to be concerned 
with (moral) guilt and not with communal shaming48 . 
This framework accepts that acknowledgement of accountability for human rights abuses does 
not necessitate punishment but can equally be achieved by requiring offenders to disclose and 
acknowledge their responsibility for the offences they have committed (TRC Report Vol. 1 
Ch. 5, 1998: 119). Thus, while general or blanket amnesties had traditionally been equivalent 
to bestowing impunity on the perpetrators of political atrocities, the innovation of the South 
African individual amnesty conditional on full disclosure makes it possible to have some form 
of accountability built into the amnesty process. 
48 In this connection it might be relevant to consider that some applicants, e.g. the ANC leadership, were 
prepared to submit collective applications making disclosures for which they were prepared to accept collective 
responsibility but not individual accountability. Significantly, the TRC was not prepared to accept these 
applications, thereby insisting on the primacy of individual accountability. An interesting question might be 
whether, from the point of view of such collective applications, those involved were prepared to subject 
themselves to communal sanctions, and even to possible public shaming, but did not accept individual 
accountability and guilt. For a case study of the 37 ANC applications see McGregor, "Individual Accountability 
in South Africa: Cultural Optimum or Political Fayade" pp. 32 45 in The American Journal of International 
Law Vol. 95 No. 32 2001. These applicants assumed responsibility for all acts committed by ANC members in 
execution of the policy decisions of the organisation without identifying any specific acts. The amnesty 
committee first granted the 37 amnesty in 1997. Following a review application in court by the TRC, 27 were 
denied amnesty on the grounds that they did not disclose individual involvement in the specific cases (Fullard 
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